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  INTRODUCTION   
In recent years, criminal justice has been marked by a surge 
in the popularity of evidence-based practices.1 The evidence-
based criminal justice movement promises to lower both incar-
ceration rates and crime through the use of big data, science, 
new technology, and smart-on-crime policies. This idea has 
broad appeal across the political spectrum and has had a large 
impact on law and policy, particularly since the budgetary crises 
of the recent recession.2  
At the forefront of the evidence-based criminal justice move-
ment are algorithmic risk assessment tools.3 Risk assessment 
tools are designed to predict the likelihood that someone will 
commit crime in the future.4 They are generated by statistically 
analyzing large data sets to identify correlations between future 
crime (as measured by rearrest or reconviction) and factors such 
as age, gender, criminal record, employment status, education 
level, etc. The predictions of the risk assessment are used to help 
determine restrictions on liberty: pretrial custody status, the 
length of the sentence, probation supervision levels, parole, and 
more.5 Their use has been rapidly expanding across the country. 
As Professor Sonja Starr puts it: “It is an understatement to re-
fer to risk assessment as a criminal justice trend. Rather, we are 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A (providing examples of evidence-based practices and 
ideas integrated into law). 
 2. See Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Cor-
rections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 566–67 (2015) (discussing the extent to 
which evidence-based practices have been incorporated into law); infra Part I.A 
(providing examples of evidence-based practices and ideas integrated into law). 
 3. Risk assessments are listed as number one on multiple lists of evidence-
based practices in criminal justice. See, e.g., CRIME & JUSTICE INST., IMPLE-
MENTING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION 3 (2004), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static 
.nicic.gov/Library/019342.pdf; NAT’L INST. CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR EVI-
DENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 13 
(2010), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/024372.pdf. 
 4. See generally infra Part III.F (defining risk assessment tools and intro-
ducing their methods). 
 5. See ANGÈLE CHRISTIN ET AL., DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS, COURTS AND PRE-
DICTIVE ALGORITHMS 2–3 (2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ 
upload_documents/Angele%20Christin.pdf (describing how risk assessment is 
used around the country). 
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already in the risk assessment era.”6 Proponents of risk assess-
ment argue that by replacing the subjective, error-prone, and ad-
hoc assessments of judges with scientifically validated prediction 
tools it is possible to dramatically reduce incarceration rates 
without affecting public safety.7 In one of the most carefully ex-
ecuted instances of the literature, the authors conduct a policy 
simulation that shows “[c]rime reductions up to 24.7% with no 
change in jailing rates, or jailing rate reductions up to 41.9% 
with no increase in crime rates” as the result of making pretrial 
custody decisions on the basis of a risk assessment algorithm.8 
Critics of risk assessment raise a number of issues, but the ques-
tion that has perhaps received the most attention is the extent 
to which risk assessment tools are racist themselves. This con-
cern was voiced by former Attorney General Eric Holder,9 and 
reflected in a widely-read study by ProPublica that claimed that 
black defendants who did not reoffend were more than twice as 
likely to be wrongly classified as high risk than white defend-
ants.10  
Despite the heated rhetoric on both sides of the aisle, virtu-
ally nothing is known about how the implementation of risk as-
sessment affects key outcomes: incarceration rates, crime, mis-
conduct, or racial disparities.11 The empirical research 
evaluating whether outcomes are improved by incorporating al-
gorithmic risk assessment into the decision-making framework 
is beyond thin; it is close to non-existent.12 Many of the “facts” 
that are cited about the impacts of risk assessment come from 
 
 6. Sonja B. Starr, The Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 205, 205 (2015). 
 7. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 553 (2012); Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and 
Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237, 240–41 (2018). 
 8. Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 238. 
 9. Massimo Calabresi, Exclusive: Attorney General Eric Holder to Oppose 
Data-Driven Sentencing, TIME (July 31, 2014), http://time.com/3061893/holder 
-to-oppose-data-driven-sentencing (discussing Holder’s concerns that risk as-
sessment will disadvantage the poor and minorities). 
 10. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algo-
rithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we 
-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. 
 11. See Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk 
Forecasts on Parole Board Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 193, 194 (2017) (stating that debates around risk assessment 
“have unfolded with scant information about how actuarial risks assessments 
have affected practices and outcomes”); infra Part II.C (offering an overview of 
the risk assessment evaluation literature). 
 12. Berk, supra note 11. 
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sources that range from detail-light non-academic reports put 
out by the agencies who designed the risk tool to nothing more 
than a single slide in a Power Point presentation.13 Somehow, 
criminal justice risk assessment has gained the near-universal 
reputation of being an evidence-based practice despite the fact 
that there is virtually no research showing that it has been ef-
fective. 
There is ample research by social scientists suggesting that 
risk assessment tools should have beneficial effects.14 Risk as-
sessment tools have been shown to be predictive of future arrest, 
and there is research suggesting (although not definitively) that 
they are better at predicting future arrest than judges are. This 
is the evidence that has earned risk assessment the “evidence-
based” moniker, and the sheen of scientific credibility that this 
moniker entails likely contributed to the exponential growth in 
its use. But transforming a practice that should be beneficial to 
one that actually does provide benefit is not always straightfor-
ward. The same human foibles that champions of risk assess-
ment point to when arguing for the adoption of risk assessment 
tools also complicate risk assessment as a policy. For instance, 
risk assessment tools may not be used as designed: they may be 
ignored or used off-label to accomplish something other than 
what was intended.15 Judges may not understand exactly what 
the risk score is measuring, or what level of statistical risk is 
associated with each risk category. The tool may be good at pre-
dicting misconduct, but the interventions taken to ameliorate 
risk may actually exacerbate it. The pressures of re-election or 
re-appointment may impact how and when the risk tool is used.  
This Article attempts to shift the conversation on risk as-
sessment away from the abstract and toward the practical. 
While it might seem futuristic to use artificial intelligence to de-
termine someone’s freedom, the impacts of risk assessment de-
pend on the same good-old-fashioned factors that have helped 
and hindered reform for centuries: context, incentives, and de-
tails of implementation. Behind risk assessments are people and 
design choices. What level of judicial discretion to allow? What 
 
 13. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part II.A (outlining scholarship that discusses the effective-
ness of human intuition as compared to actuarial tools). 
 15. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing 
that the risk assessment tools used at sentencing were not designed for that 
purpose); Sandra Mayson, Off-Label Law Enforcement (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (discussing various ways criminal law is used to 
accomplish something other than intended). 
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criminal justice interventions to recommend for each risk group? 
How to communicate statistical risk to the decision-makers? 
What accountability measures are in place? Getting these 
choices right may take time and revision; determining what con-
stitutes right takes discussion amongst stakeholders.16 
This Article also presents some of the first rigorous empiri-
cal evidence on the impacts of risk assessment in practice. In 
particular, it focuses on the role of risk assessment in the rapidly 
proliferating bail reform movement. In the last few years, dozens 
of jurisdictions have reduced the use of monetary bail and 
adopted risk assessment tools to help determine pretrial cus-
tody.17 In doing so, they have followed in the footsteps of one of 
bail reform’s pioneers: the bluegrass state of Kentucky.18 The 
bail reform bill recently adopted by California’s legislature was 
modeled after Kentucky’s “shining example.”19 The most widely-
used pretrial risk assessment tool in the country, the Public 
Safety Assessment (PSA), was developed and piloted in Ken-
tucky.20 The bipartisan bail reform bill proposed by Senators 
Rand Paul (R-KY) and Kamala Harris (D-CA) would induce 
states to adopt a Kentucky-style pretrial system.21 
 
 16. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sen-
tencing and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583 (2018) (providing a framework 
for determining how risk assessments should be used, based on the fit principle, 
validity principle, and the fairness principle). 
 17. See infra Part I.C (discussing the current bail reform movement). 
 18. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., 
MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 19 (2016), http://cjpp.law 
.harvard.edu/publications/primer-bail-reform (highlighting Kentucky’s use of 
pretrial risk assessment as an example that other jurisdictions are following); 
ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRETRIAL RELEASE 8–9 (2012–2013), https://www.pretrial.org/download/policy 
-statements/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-%20COSCA%20 
2012.pdf (citing Kentucky as an example of “successful implementation of evi-
dence-based pretrial assessments”); Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjec-
ture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html?_r=0 
(“Kentucky has used a risk-assessment tool for decades, and is a leader among 
states when it comes to court appearance rates and low recidivism.”). 
 19. Samantha Young, To Fix ‘Unfair’ Bail System, Will California Copy 
Kentucky?, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.dailynews.com/2017/ 
08/13/to-fix-unfair-bail-system-will-california-copy-kentucky. 
 20. See infra note 260, at 3, 5. 
 21. See Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Opinion, To Shrink Our Jails, Let’s 
Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html (stating that 
their proposed bill empowers states to build on best practices, citing Kentucky’s 
use of risk assessments as an example of such practices). 
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Using detailed data on more than a million criminal cases, 
this Article analyzes the use of pretrial risk assessment in Ken-
tucky. Kentucky has had some sort of pretrial risk tool available 
to judges since 1976; however, its use was optional and many 
judges disregarded it. In 2011, Kentucky passed a law (House 
Bill 463, or HB 463)22 that made use of pretrial risk assessment 
mandatory and declared a presumptive default of immediate, 
non-monetary release for all low and moderate-risk defend-
ants.23 Despite being crafted with the explicit goal of lowering 
incarceration rates,24 HB 463 led to only a trivial increase in pre-
trial release.25 Furthermore, the increase in the release rate was 
matched by an uptick in failure-to-appear (FTA) rates and pre-
trial crime;26 a disappointing counter to hopes that all three mar-
gins could be improved simultaneously. The low increase in re-
leases is partly because judges took advantage of the discretion 
allowed to them by law and ignored the presumptive default of 
non-monetary release in more than two-thirds of cases.27 But 
this is not the whole story. In fact, HB 463 led to a marked 
change in bail-setting practices. There was a 63% increase in the 
rate at which judges granted non-monetary release for low-risk 
 
 22. Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, H.B. 463, 2011 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011). 
 23. Ninety percent of defendants were ranked as low or moderate risk. KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2011) (codifying H.B. 463) (instructing 
judges to consider the risk assessment when considering release and bail); id. 
§ 431.066(3) (instructing release on unsecured bond or own recognizance for low 
risk defendants); id. § 431.066(4) (instructing release on unsecured bond or own 
recognizance for moderate risk defendants with possible supervision, monitor-
ing or other conditions of release); id. § 27A.096(1)–(3) (West 2011) (instructing 
judges to follow guidelines set by the Supreme Court on pretrial release or su-
pervision for moderate and high risk defendants); SUPREME COURT OF KY., OR-
DER APPROVING JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MONITORED 
CONDITIONAL RELEASE (2011–2012), http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/ 
Rules_Procedures/201112.pdf (generally affirming the centrality of the risk as-
sessment tool in the release decision although granting judges the latitude to 
deviate from it; instructing pretrial services to develop a risk reduction plan 
including various conditions of release for judges to consider for high risk de-
fendants). 
 24. HB 463 was drafted with the goals of reducing incarceration rates while 
maintaining public safety. See Senator Tom Jensen & Representative John Til-
ley, HB 463 – Statement from the Sponsors, in CRIMINAL LAW REFORM: THE 
FIRST YEAR OF HB 463 1 (2012), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/kybar.site-ym.com/ 
resource/resmgr/2012_Convention_Files/ac2012_2.pdf. 
 25. See infra Part III.D (discussing risk assessment’s impact on bond-set-
ting practices). 
 26. Infra Figure 7. 
 27. Based on author’s own calculations. 
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defendants, and a more moderate increase in release for moder-
ate-risk defendants.28 High-risk defendants were released at 
lower rates.29 Thus, while there was a change in the type of de-
fendants released, as well as the conditions of release, the net 
effects on the overall release rate were small. Furthermore, they 
were not permanent: the sharp change in practices and outcomes 
that occurred right after the law was implemented eroded over 
time as judges returned to their previous bail-setting practices.30 
Within a couple of years, the pretrial release rate was lower than 
it was before the bill, and lower than the national average.31 
As for racial disparities, the story is less straightforward. 
Facially, HB 463 benefited white defendants more than blacks.32 
However, this is not because the risk assessment was more ra-
cially biased than judicial discretion. Rather, it is due to regional 
differences in how judges responded to HB 463.33 Judges from 
predominantly white rural counties liberalized their bail setting 
practices more than judges from more racially mixed urban ar-
eas, but within the same county, white and black defendants saw 
similar increases in release.34 Once county effects were taken 
into account, racial disparities remain constant throughout the 
time period of the analysis.35 
In 2013 Kentucky adopted a new risk assessment tool called 
the PSA.36 This tool was developed by the Laura & John Arnold 
Foundation using a nationally representative dataset of more 
than 1.5 million observations.37 Since it was first piloted in Ken-
tucky, it has received considerable national attention and has 
 
 28. See infra Part III.D (discussing the empirical effects of H.B. 463). 
 29. Id. 
 30. The fact that judges drifted back to their previous bail setting habits 
means that a randomized control trial that evaluated only short term effects 
would overstate its impact. 
 31. In 2015, twenty-six percent of Kentucky’s felony defendants were re-
leased within a day. In contrast, fifty percent of felony defendants were released 
within a day of arrest in the most comprehensive national-level dataset availa-
ble. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS 
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 18 (2013). 
 32. Infra Figure 11. 
 33. See infra Part III.F (evaluating whether risk assessment affected racial 
disparities in bond-setting practices). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See infra Part III.A (offering an overview of Kentucky’s use of pretrial 
risk assessments). 
 37. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK 
FACTORS AND FORMULA 2 (2013–2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp 
-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf. 
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become one of the most widely used pretrial risk assessment 
tools.38 The switch from Kentucky’s local risk assessment tool to 
the PSA did not result in any noticeable improvement in out-
comes. There was a small increase in the use of non-financial 
bond, and essentially no effect on releases, FTAs, pretrial crime, 
or racial disparities in detention.39 
As a case study, Kentucky offers important lessons for the 
bail reform movement, as well as for jurisdictions that have im-
plemented or are considering implementing risk assessment in 
other criminal justice contexts.40 First, Kentucky’s experience 
should temper hopes that risk assessment is a magic bullet that 
will increase the number of people released pretrial with no con-
comitant costs in terms of the crime or appearance rate. Risk 
assessment may offer improvements over the status quo, but 
have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too promises are, as of yet, unsub-
stantiated.41 Second, the Kentucky findings should ease (but not 
eliminate) concerns that risk assessment tools will exacerbate 
racial disparities. While pretrial risk assessment did not affect 
racial disparities in Kentucky once regional trends were ac-
counted for, scholars should continue to evaluate this question 
in other jurisdictions. Third, Kentucky demonstrates the chal-
lenges of trying to change criminal justice decision-making 
through technocratic reform. Kentucky’s statutes express a 
strong presumption of pretrial release, which accords with the 
stated goals of the bill’s sponsors.42 If judges followed the action-
 
 38. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: 
A RE-VALIDATION AND ASSESSMENT OF PREDICTIVE UTILITY AND DIFFERENTIAL 
PREDICTION BY RACE AND GENDER IN KENTUCKY 5 (2018), http://www.arnold 
foundation.org/the-psa-a-re-validation-and-assessment-of-predictive-utility 
-and-differential-prediction-by-race-and-gender-in-kentucky/ (stating that the 
PSA is currently being used in thirty-eight jurisdictions including three entire 
states) [hereinafter LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., A RE-VALIDATION]. 
 39. See infra Parts III.D, III.E, and III.F. 
 40. Dozens of jurisdictions have recently adopted risk assessment tools, and 
others are actively considering it. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., A RE-
VALIDATION, supra note 38, at 5 (reporting that the PSA, piloted in Kentucky 
in 2013, is now in use in thirty-eight jurisdictions including three entire states, 
three of the largest cities, and two of the largest jail systems); Starr, supra note 
6, at 1 (observing that risk assessment is being used in sentencing in at least 
twenty states).  
 41. See infra Part II.C (offering an overview of the risk assessment evalua-
tion literature). 
 42. See Senator Jensen & Representative Tilley, supra note 24, at 2 (“The 
reforms in House Bill 463 are expected to bring a gross savings of $422 million 
over ten years by reducing the state’s burgeoning prison population.”). 
  
2018] ASSESSING RISK ASSESSMENT 311 
 
directives associated with the risk assessment—the statutory in-
structions that set a presumptive default for how defendants 
with differing risk levels are to be treated—90% of defendants 
would be granted immediate non-financial release. In practice, 
only 29% are released on non-monetary bond at the first bail-
setting. If judges are not convinced or coerced to follow statutory 
guidelines, a risk assessment tool will not be an effective method 
of liberalizing release.  
Ultimately, this Article calls for a change in how evidence-
based criminal justice is practiced and conceived. A practice 
should not be considered evidence-based because it references 
big data sets and sophisticated techniques—it should be consid-
ered evidence-based because its impacts have been carefully re-
searched and understood. Rapid proliferation of a method with 
no knowledge of its effects is risky. Further, it precludes mean-
ingful dialogue between the many well-intentioned individuals 
who want our criminal justice system to improve but have differ-
ing expectations about what the new tool will bring. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief over-
view of evidence-based criminal justice, risk assessments, and 
the current bail reform movement. Part II discusses the empiri-
cal literature on risk assessment: the papers that claim that risk 
assessment tools are better at predicting future crime than 
judges, the recent studies of racial bias in risk assessments, and 
the slim set of research on the impacts of risk assessment in 
practice. In discussing the literature, Part II also explores some 
of the reasons why the impacts of risk assessment may be differ-
ent or more complicated than expected. Part III presents an em-
pirical evaluation of pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky. In 
particular, it uses graphical time-trend analysis to show how HB 
463 and the adoption of the PSA affected bail practices, release 
rates, pretrial misconduct, and racial disparities. Part IV dis-
cusses various lessons that can be drawn from Kentucky’s expe-
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I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND BAIL REFORM   
A. EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
The “evidence-based” moniker is used in a variety of subjects 
and refers to the idea that practices should be rigorously evalu-
ated for their efficacy.43 The phrase was first used in the medical 
literature of the early 1990s:44 “evidence-based medicine” be-
came the key term to describe a movement toward practices that 
had been proven effective in clinical trial as opposed to those 
supported only by anecdote or opinion.45 The phrase “evidence-
based” was first applied to criminal justice in the late 1990s,46 
but a shift toward evaluating criminal justice programs for their 
efficacy had begun long before that.47 In 1974, Robert Martinson 
published a synthesis of research in correctional programs that 
was broadly interpreted as showing that nothing works (i.e., that 
programs designed to rehabilitate offenders do not actually 
lower crime).48 This study was one of the factors that led to a 
shift away from the rehabilitative model of corrections that had 
previously dominated the field and is often marked by scholars 
as the beginning of the New Penology:49 a paradigm in criminal 
justice which prioritizes risk management, not rehabilitation.50 
Criminologists, however, did not abandon hopes that certain 
criminal justice programs were effective. The rapid expansion of 
computer power in the 1980s and 1990s paralleled a rapid ex-
pansion of criminal justice research, and scholars began to iden-
 
 43. See STAN ORCHOWSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE-BASED PRAC-
TICES 2 (2014). 
 44. Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to 
Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420 (1992). 
 45. ORCHOWSKY, supra 43, at 2–3. A 1976 report from the U.S. Office of 
Technology Assessment stated that “only 10 to 20% of all procedures used in 
present medical practice have been proven by clinical trial.” OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLO-
GIES 7 (1978). 
 46. ORCHOWSKY, supra note 43, at 3. 
 47. Id. at 2–4. 
 48. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974). 
 49. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the 
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 
449–50 (1992). 
 50. Id. at 455. 
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tify a selection of policies that appeared to be effective at reduc-
ing crime.51 The idea that nothing works slowly lost ground in 
favor of the idea that some methods do work. The evidence-based 
criminal justice movement aims to identify and expand the use 
of practices that social science research has demonstrated to be 
effective.52 Partly as a result of efforts by organizations such as 
the National Institute of Corrections and the Justice Reinvest-
ment Initiative, the ideas associated with evidence-based crimi-
nal justice gained popularity throughout the 2000s and are now 
core to law and policy around the country.53 
The Office of Justice Programs provides a useful definition 
of key terms. It considers practices to be evidence-based “when 
their effectiveness has been demonstrated by causal evidence ob-
tained through high-quality outcome evaluations.”54 Outcome 
evaluations refer to social science research that attempts to infer 
the causal impact of a particular program or policy by comparing 
outcomes for a group of people affected by that policy to outcomes 
for a control group of people not affected by that policy.55 The 
extent to which research can be interpreted as evidence of a 
causal relationship between a policy and an outcome depends on 
the extent to which other explanations for the correlation can be 
ruled out.56 Determining whether a particular policy is evidence-
based depends on the quality, quantity, and consistency of the 
social science research demonstrating its impact.57 
The ideas and practices associated with evidence-based 
criminal justice have made significant headway into law and pol-
icy at the state, local, and federal level.58 This includes general 
 
 51. See ORCHOWSKY, supra note 43, at 3–4; Klingele, supra note 2, at 544–
55.  
 52. CRIME & JUSTICE INST., supra note 3, at 1–3. 
 53. See Klingele, supra note 2, at 551–67 for an excellent overview of the 
rise of evidence-based criminal justice. 
 54. Glossary: Evidence-Based Programs, CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV, https:// 
www.crimesolutions.gov/GlossaryDetails.aspx?ID=15 (last visited Oct. 22, 
2018). 
 55. For example, this Article compares pretrial release rates for the group 
of defendants who were booked right before HB 463 was introduced, to pretrial 
release rates for defendants who were booked right after HB 463 was imple-
mented. 
 56. See CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV, supra note 54. 
 57. The term evidence-based is sometimes used in a looser way, as simply 
integrating the best available research into decision making and practice.  
 58. See ELIZABETH DAVIES ET AL., URBAN INST., THE JUSTICE REINVEST-
MENT INITIATIVE: THINKING LOCAL FOR STATE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 1 
(2015). The Justice Reinvestment Initiative has helped spread evidence-based 
practices into twenty-four states. Annual Report 2016: Director’s Message, U.S. 
  
314 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:303 
 
instructions to use evidence-based principles,59 specific instruc-
tions for the fraction of state expenditures that must be spent on 
evidence-based practices,60 and orders to adopt specific evidence-
based practices.61 
B. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Evaluating the risk of future criminal activity has long been 
part of practice in criminal justice. The term “risk assessment,” 
however, usually refers to the use of formal, actuarial, and algo-
rithmic methods of predicting the likelihood of future crime or 
misconduct.62 (In practice, however, they predict what is visible: 
arrest, conviction, reincarceration, probation revocation, etc.)63 
Actuarial risk assessment tools have been in use in criminal jus-
tice since the 1920s,64 but their use has rapidly accelerated over 
recent years.65 These tools help to determine bail or the condi-
tions of release, set the sentence length, determine the level of 
supervision for probationers, evaluate a request for parole, and 
 
COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/annual-report-2016. 
The director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts attributes a decline 
in recidivism to their use of evidence-based practices. 
 59. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 6-201.01 (2017) (instructing probation 
departments to develop evidence-based policies and procedures); IDAHO CODE 
§ 20-219-5 (2016) (instructing the state board of corrections to use evidence-
based practices in supervising probationers and parolees). 
 60. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27A.097(5) (West 2011) (stating that, 
by July 1, 2016, seventy-five percent of “state moneys expended on supervision 
and intervention programs . . . shall be for programs that are in accordance with 
evidence-based practices”). 
 61. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2016) (adopting a risk assess-
ment instrument in sentencing); S.B. 6204, 624 Leg. 1st Spec. Sess. §§ 11.1, 11.2 
(Wash. 2012) (adopting swift and certain sanctions in community supervision). 
 62. See NAT’L INST. CORR., supra note 3, at 13 (noting that risk assessment 
tools help to predict “risk of reoffense more effectively than professional judge-
ment alone”). 
 63. See Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Ration-
alization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 855–57 (2014) (noting that 
evidence-based sentencing tools do not actually tell judges how much crime a 
defendant will commit in the future, but rather, the judge is told how risky a 
defendant is based upon their past conduct). 
 64. See generally Howard G. Borden, Factors for Predicting Parole Success, 
19 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328 (1928) (discussing actuarial risk 
assessment tools). 
 65. See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L. J. 490, 493 
(2017) (“It is hard to overstate the momentum behind this shift . . . Jurisdictions 
around the country are increasingly turning to risk assessment as the keystone 
of pretrial reform.”). 
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choose the appropriate rehabilitative program or restriction on 
liberty for juvenile offenders.66  
Most risk assessment tools currently in use are fairly simple 
checklist-style tools.67 These tools take a set of inputs, usually 
between seven and fifteen, and assign a certain number of points 
to each input.68 The points assigned to each input are deter-
mined through statistical analyses that evaluate how well each 
input predicts the outcome.69 The inputs to a risk assessment 
algorithm almost always include criminal history or criminal-
justice-related misconduct.70 Some also include socio-economic 
factors such as education level, marital status, or home neigh-
borhood.71 Age and gender are often included, but race is not.72 
The risk score is then calculated by summing the points assigned 
to each input.73 Usually, the risk score is then aggregated to a 
small group of risk classifications: people with the lowest scores 
are labeled low risk, those with medium scores are labeled mod-
erate risk, and those with the highest scores are labeled high 
risk.74 The decision about what fraction of defendants belong in 
each bin is a normative one.75 
In addition to the checklist-style risk assessments described 
above, there are more complicated methods of evaluating risk 
that are developed through a method called machine learning.76 
Machine-learned risk assessment tools are designed by a com-
puter itself with a little guidance from the person that develops 
them.77 The researcher tells the computer which inputs to use, 
 
 66. See CHRISTIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2–3 and accompanying text (not-
ing that risk assessment tools help to determine restrictions on liberty). 
 67. Mayson, supra note 65, at 509. 
 68. Id. at 511. 
 69. See id. at 513 (explaining the construction of common pretrial risk as-
sessment instruments). 
 70. See id. at 512. 
 71. See Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sex-
ual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 14–18 (2015) (explaining 
the construction of risk assessment instruments predicting violent or sexual 
crime); Mayson, supra note 65, at 507–18 (explaining the construction of com-
mon pretrial risk assessment instruments). 
 72. CHRISTIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 1, 6. 
 73. Mayson, supra note 65, at 509. 
 74. Id. at 513. 
 75. See id. at 510–15 (discussing risk assessment tools and noting that clas-
sifications are validated against a class of individuals with known outcomes). 
 76. Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to 
Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 222–24 (2015) (provid-
ing an overview of machine learned risk predictions in criminal justice). 
 77. Id. 
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which outcomes to predict, and which learning method to use.78 
The computer does the rest. Machine-learned risk assessments 
tend to be black-box mechanisms; it is hard to understand why 
they yield the predictions that they do.79 This is because the re-
lationship between the inputs and the risk score is non-linear 
and varied.80 For example, a machine-learned risk instrument 
might show that the impact age has on the likelihood of future 
arrest is different for people who are facing drug charges than 
for those who are facing domestic violence charges.81 Machine-
learned predictions can be more accurate than the simpler 
checklist-style tools.82 However, they are still uncommon in 
criminal justice. The black-box nature of the tool makes them 
non-transparent, which raises legal and ethical issues:83 it is dif-
ficult to challenge a high-risk classification if one does not know 
the reasons behind the classification.84 Furthermore, they re-
quire a higher level of technical training to build and imple-
ment.85 
Often, the risk classifications come with explicit action-di-
rectives that specify how people in each of the risk categories are 
to be treated.86 These action-directives take the form of statutory 
instructions, rules, or local policy.87 A common principle is that 
 
 78. Id. at 223–27 (explaining the process of building criminal justice risk 
assessments using machine learning tools). 
 79. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposi-
tion, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 284 (2013). 
 80. Id. at 285. 
 81. See Mayson, supra note 65, at 508, 514, 564 (noting that some traits, 
like drug addiction, require some subjective judgement, that algorithms have 
been developed to predict rearrest for domestic violence charges, and that age 
is not an accurate predictor of violent crimes). 
 82. Berk & Hyatt, supra note 76, at 222. 
 83. See Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Eth-
ical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 267–71 (2015) (discussing legal is-
sues related to transparency in risk assessment); Hannah-Moffatt, supra note 
79, at 284–86 (discussing transparency concerns with risk assessment). 
 84. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 286. 
 85. See id. at 273 (noting that there is required training in order to use 
general risk tools). 
 86. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assess-
ment and the Future of Bail Reform, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). What I 
call action-directives are sometimes also referred to as “structured decision-
making process,” “pretrial decision-making matrix,” or a “decision making 
framework.” 
 87. See id. at 41–42 (discussing the influence of local governments and com-
munities on policy judgements). 
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both rehabilitative interventions and restrictions on liberty in-
crease as the risk level increases.88 The choice of what type of 
risk to predict (i.e. what outcome in what time window), which 
algorithm to use to predict that risk, how to divide the group into 
different classification levels, and which criminal justice actions 
(e.g. bail amounts, sentence lengths, etc.) are appropriate for 
each risk level are all choices that depend, at least partially, on 
the normative and legal landscape.89 
Risk assessment tools are one of the most prominent and 
widely adopted methods associated with the evidence-based 
criminal justice movement.90 The National Institute of Correc-
tions, an organization that has been deeply involved in the ad-
vancement of evidence-based criminal justice, ranks risk assess-
ment tools at number one in a list of evidence-based ways to 
reduce recidivism.91 Risk assessment tools are so closely tied to 
the evidence-based movement that the terminology is sometimes 
interchangeable: the use of risk assessment in sentencing is of-
ten referred to as simply evidence-based sentencing.92  
C. RISK ASSESSMENT IN BAIL REFORM 
The method of determining which defendants are released, 
released on conditions, or detained pretrial has been one of the 
most rapidly changing areas of criminal justice over the last cou-
ple of years.93 The current bail reform movement encourages de-
cision-making based on the risk of flight or future crime, not the 
ability to pay bail.94 Critics of the monetary bail system argue 
that conditioning release on money results in racial and wealth-
based disparities in detention, a waste of taxpayer money, and 
 
 88. See Mayson, supra note 65, at 515 (explaining different pretrial options 
based upon defendant risk level). 
 89. See Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 289–90 (discussing the various 
choices that institutions make when instituting evidence-based sentencing). 
 90. Starr, supra note 63, at 805. 
 91. NAT’L INST. CORR., supra note 3, at 13. 
 92. See Starr, supra note 63, at 805 (discussing risk assessment tools in the 
context of “evidence-based sentencing”). 
 93. For an overview of the history of bail, see TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L 
INST. CORR., FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRAC-
TITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 40–41 (2014). 
 94. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, Res. 112C, at 1, 6 (2017) (urging the prohibi-
tion of policies that result in pretrial detention solely on the ability to pay, and 
providing that judges can order detention for those who have been shown, with 
clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of release will reasonably en-
sure appearance in court or public safety).  
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harm to public safety.95 Defendants who pose a low risk of crime 
or flight, they argue, should not be detained due to an inability 
to pay monetary bail.96 Conversely, wealthy defendants who 
pose a high risk of serious crime should not be released simply 
because they can afford bail.97 Many, including this author, have 
argued that pretrial detention or electronic monitoring should be 
reserved for those who pose a high risk of violent crime or 
flight.98 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[i]n our society 
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial 
is the carefully limited exception.”99 
Dozens, if not hundreds, of jurisdictions are pursuing or 
have recently implemented wholesale changes to their bail prac-
tices.100 By a recent count, bail reform efforts are active in all but 
a handful of states.101 Supporters of reform can be found across 
party lines and across agencies: public defenders, district attor-
neys, judges, governors, sheriffs, and so forth.102 
 
 95. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 6–8. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. See id. at 12 (observing that paying bail may not be an adequate incen-
tive for some very wealthy defendants to appear). 
 98. Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, 
in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21, 23 (Erik 
Luna ed., 2017). 
 99. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 100. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAP-
PENING 1–5 (2017) (providing an overview of recent changes to pretrial practices 
across the United States). 
 101. Id. at 15–17. 
 102. See, e.g., Tamara Aparton, SF Public Defenders Stand Up to Money 
Bail, S.F. PUB. DEFENDER (Oct. 25, 2017), http://sfpublicdefender.org/news/ 
2017/10/sf-public-defenders-stand-up-to-money-bail (“In response to a pair of 
major statewide developments in the fight to abolish money bail, San Francisco 
public defenders will file challenges in every criminal case in which bail is set.”); 
Megan Cassidy, Bond Companies ‘Extremely Worried’ as Arizona Moves Away 
From Cash Bail Bonds, AZ CENT. (June 21, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/ 
story/news/local/arizona/2017/06/21/arizona-courts-back-away-cash-bail 
-system-bond-companies-worried/400209001 (“The state’s Supreme Court di-
rects judges to minimize cash system bail bonds for pretrial release in favor of 
risk-based analysis.”); Katie Greer, Bail System Failures Justify Reform, RIGHT 
ON CRIME (Sept. 5, 2017), http://rightoncrime.com/2017/09/bail-system-failures 
-justify-reform (“[C]ash based bail systems have failed to ensure public safety 
or equal access to justice by jailing defendants who simply couldn’t afford to pay 
bail.”); Christopher Keating, House Passes Governor’s Bail Reform, HARTFORD 
COURANT (June 3, 2017), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-legislature-bail 
-reform-20170603-story.html (“The state House of Representatives voted Satur-
day to approve bail reform for those arrested for some misdemeanors, one of 
Gov. Dannel P. Malloy’s highest priorities.”); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Defendants 
Can’t Be Jailed Solely Because of Inability to Post Bail, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/chicago-bail-reform 
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Bail reform is a rare area of bipartisan cooperation in the 
U.S. Senate: Senator Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Senator Rand 
Paul (R-KY) recently introduced a joint bill to use federal fund-
ing to encourage states to reform or replace the practice of money 
bail.103 Change has come in the form of new legislation,104 revi-
sions to state constitutions,105 new judiciary rules as decreed by 
state courts,106 and as the result of civil rights litigation.107 Class 
action lawsuits have been filed in jurisdictions across the coun-
try claiming that current bail practices violate due process pro-
tections and the Equal Rights Amendment.108 These lawsuits 
have resulted in a number of consent decrees entailing reform to 
local pretrial processes, as well as a landmark federal ruling, 
ODonnell v. Harris County, ordering the pretrial release of mis-
demeanor defendants who cannot afford bail.109  
In shifting the emphasis toward risk as opposed to the abil-
ity to pay bail, the recent bail reform movement has been inti-
 
.html (“Cook County sheriff, Tom Dart, who supports bail-reform efforts. . . .”); 
Real Change in the DA’s Office, LARRY KRASNER FOR DA, https://krasnerforda 
.com/platform (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (“[Larry] will . . . reform our broken 
cash bail system . . . [H]e will seek alternatives to incarceration – dramatically 
reducing the number of prisoners held, saving millions of tax dollars, and letting 
wounded communities begin to heal.”) (hereinafter KRASNER). 
 103. Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act, S. 1593, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 104. See, e.g., Mark Pazniokas & Keith M. Phaneuf, Bail Reform Wins Final 
Passage in Senate, CONN. MIRROR (June 7, 2017), https://ctmirror.org/2017/06/ 
07/bail-reform-wins-final-passage-in-senate (describing new bail reform law 
and its impact in Connecticut). 
 105. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 106. See, e.g., Michael Dresser, Maryland Court of Appeals: Defendants 
Can’t Be Held in Jail Because They Can’t Afford Bail, BALT. SUN (Feb. 8, 
2017), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-bail-rule-20170207 
-story.html (discussing a new rule by Maryland’s highest court that is designed 
to reduce the use of cash bail). 
 107. Litigation designed to reform bail practices is either active or recently 
resolved in Texas, Louisiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, Georgia, Tennessee, Ala-
bama, California, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi, and Missouri. See Challeng-
ing the Money Bail System, C.R. CORPS, http://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/ 
wealth-based-detention (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Challenging the 
Money Bail]; Ending Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention, C.R. CORPS, https://web 
.archive.org/web/20170817195205/http://civilrightscorps.org/ending-wealth 
-based-pretrial-detention (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Ending 
Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention]; see also Ending American Money Bail, EQUAL 
JUST. UNDER L., https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2018).  
 108. See, e.g., Ending Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention, supra note 107 (de-
scribing the cases as ending “unconstitutional wealth-based pretrial detention 
policies”); EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER L., supra note 107. 
 109. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2016). 
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mately linked with the adoption of actuarial risk assessment in-
struments.110 While exact details differ across jurisdictions, the 
new model generally involves reducing or eliminating the use of 
monetary bail and adopting a risk assessment tool to help judges 
make decisions about pretrial custody.111 This has resulted in a 
rapid proliferation of the use of pretrial risk assessments. The 
pretrial risk assessment tool developed by the Arnold Founda-
tion has been adopted by dozens of jurisdictions and three entire 
states in the last few years.112 The Harris-Paul bail reform bill 
encourages states to replace money bail with pretrial risk assess-
ment.113 States such as New Jersey and New Mexico have re-
vised their constitution to allow for direct orders of detention on 
the basis of risk as determined, at least in part, by actuarial risk 
assessment.114 Across the country, as a result of changes enacted 
by the executive branch, legislature, and the judiciary, jurisdic-
tions are adopting pretrial risk assessment.115  
The current wave of bail reform is still in flux. The extent 
and exact nature of the changes depends partially on battles that 
are being waged in city halls, courthouses, and the court of public 
opinion around the country.116 Risk assessments are controver-
sial, and not all agree that they should play a central role in bail 
reform.117 Currently, however, risk assessments are a dominant 
theme in a rapidly accelerating reform movement. 
 
 110. See Mayson, supra note 65, at 492–99 (providing an overview of the re-
cent bail reform movement). 
 111. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 100, at 5 (listing adoption of risk 
assessment as part of bail reform in many jurisdictions). 
 112. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., A RE-VALIDATION, supra note 38. 
 113. See Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, U.S. Senator for Cal., Harris, 
Paul Introduce Bill to Encourage States to Reform or Replace Unjust, Costly 
Money Bail System (July 20, 2017), https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press 
-releases/harris-paul-introduce-bill-to-encourage-states-to-reform-or-replace 
-unjust-costly-money-bail-system. 
 114. See Matthew Coyte, New Pretrial Risk Assessment More Fair, ALBU-
QUERQUE J. (June 14, 2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/1017512/new-pretrial 
-risk-assessment-more-fair.html (discussing New Mexico’s recent constitutional 
changes and the implementation of risk assessment in Albuquerque’s most pop-
ulous county); see also infra note 231, at 3 (discussing role of risk assessment in 
New Jersey’s reforms). 
 115. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 100, at 10–14.  
 116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using 
Profile-Based Risk Assessment in Bail Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17, 
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/human-rights-watch-advises 
-against-using-profile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform (arguing against the 
use of risk assessment tools in bail reform). 
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II.  RISK ASSESSMENT: THE SLIM EVIDENCE   
This Part provides an overview of the empirical literature 
that has influenced expectations about the impacts of risk as-
sessment.118 Section A summarizes research on whether risk as-
sessment algorithms are better at predicting future crime than 
judges. Section B discusses the literature on racial bias in risk 
assessment. Section C presents some of the reasons why risk as-
sessment in practice may be different than expected. It also dis-
cusses the slim evidence on how the use of risk assessment af-
fects outcomes relative to the status quo method of making 
decisions. 
A. ALGORITHMIC PREDICTION VS. HUMAN INTUITION 
The most common argument in support of risk assessment 
is that formal, actuarial, and algorithmic methods of prediction 
perform better than the intuitive methods used by judges or 
other experts.119 Thus, by making smarter decisions about who 
to release, jurisdictions could decrease detention rates while 
keeping crime and non-appearance rates constant, or vice versa. 
The idea that actuarial tools outperform human intuition in pre-
dicting crime has become broadly accepted.120 Indeed, there is a 
long list of papers claiming to have demonstrated this empiri-
cally. A commonly cited meta-analysis, published in 2000, claims 
 
 118. This Section does not include studies showing that risk assessments are 
effective at predicting criminal activity unless the study compares the predictive 
power of risk assessments to the informal predictions of judges or other criminal 
justice practitioners. 
 119. SARAH PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DEMYS-
TIFYING RISK ASSESSMENT: KEY PRINCIPLES AND CONTROVERSIES 8 (2017) (“On 
balance, actuarial—or data-driven—risk models have tended to outperform the 
judgments of individual practitioners, including clinical professionals, in accu-
rately assessing risk. Thus the rationale behind expanding the use of formal 
risk assessment tools is that they offer the potential for helping justice agencies 
make more informed decisions.”); cf. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 417, 438–54 (2016) (arguing for adopting risk assessment as a 
way to counter a principal-agent problem because by shielding judges from per-
sonal responsibility, their actions may closer reflect society’s interests). 
 120. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk As-
sessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (“Our thesis is straightforward: actuarial 
methods have proven equal or superior to clinical judgements.”); Steven L. 
Chanenson & Jordan M. Hyatt, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Im-
plications for Research and Policy (Villanova Univ. Charles Widger Sch. of Law 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2017-1040, 2016) (“[T]here is a 
significant literature that suggests that, with regard to accuracy, statistical 
methods generally outperform subjective clinical judgments.”). 
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that “[o]n average, mechanical [i.e., actuarial and algorithmic] 
prediction techniques were about 10% more accurate than clini-
cal [i.e., human] predictions.”121 This meta-analysis includes ten 
papers that compare algorithmic to human predictions in the 
criminal justice context.122 These papers, however, are dated: All 
were published before 1988, and most use small samples and 
questionable analytic techniques.123 In addition to the older lit-
erature, a number of more recent papers argue that statistical 
tools are better at predicting future offending than judges or 
magistrates.124 These papers use much larger data sets and more 
advanced methodologies than the earlier literature. However, 
both the earlier papers and the more recent ones follow a similar 
pattern and are susceptible to many of the same critiques.  
Proving that algorithms can predict better than human be-
ings is not easy. Ideally, research comparing the two methods of 
prediction would be explicitly set up as a horse race between the 
two approaches. Both humans and algorithms would make pre-
dictions about a particular, well-defined outcome, and a winner 
would be declared based on the accuracy of their predictions. Un-
fortunately, most prior studies comparing different methods of 
predicting crime do not follow such an approach. Instead, most 
prior papers consist of post-hoc observational analyses that rely 
on numerous tenuous assumptions in order to draw inference. 
This is best demonstrated by example. 
A recently released paper called Human Decisions and Ma-
chine Predictions is one of the more carefully executed instances 
of the literature and is a good demonstration of its strengths and 
 
 121. William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-
Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000).  
 122. Id. at 22–24. 
 123. Id. But see Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments 
of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 417 (2001) (critiquing ana-
lytic techniques relied upon by Grove et al.); see also Starr, supra note 63, at 
850–55 (arguing that there is not yet any persuasive evidence that actuarial 
instruments outperform judges’ predictions). 
 124. See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, at 553–54 (“Even with 
this increase in releases, because we are better targeting which defendants to 
release, pretrial violent-crime rates would decrease.”); Kleinberg et al., supra 
note 7, at 271 (“We find the algorithm dominates each judge in our data set that 
sees a large enough caseload to let us construct a meaningful comparison.”); 
Jongbin Jung et al., Simple Rules for Complex Decisions (Apr. 4, 2017) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (“In nearly every instance, the sta-
tistical decision rules outperform the human decision-maker.”). 
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limitations.125 This paper uses detailed data on pretrial defend-
ants in New York City to estimate the risk of failing to appear in 
court or committing another crime.126 The authors use machine-
learning techniques—complex computer-based methods of pre-
dicting risk—to build a prediction for each defendant.127 The in-
puts to the model include criminal history, current offense, and 
age as predictors for misconduct (rearrest or nonappearance in 
court) among the group of defendants who were released pre-
trial.128 The authors then conduct a policy simulation in which 
they estimate what the crime rate would have been if, instead of 
following the status quo procedure, the decision on whether to 
release or detain a defendant had been made solely by the ma-
chine-learned algorithm.129 They estimate that if the detention 
decision was made by their tool that crime could be dramatically 
lowered while the detention rate remains constant, or that the 
detention rate could be dramatically lowered while the crime 
rate remains constant.130 
One of the main challenges to determining whether the al-
gorithm outperforms the judges is that the authors do not di-
rectly observe the judges’ predictions. They attempt to infer the 
predictions by looking at which defendants were detained pre-
trial.131 There is undoubtedly a connection between the predic-
tions of the judge and the detention status of defendants, but this 
connection is noisy and mediated by several other factors. Most 
notably, judges are not, by and large, directly determining de-
tention. They are setting bail, and the defendant will be released 
if he or she posts bail. The bail amount is not supposed to keep a 
defendant detained (although it can be used that way); it is sup-
posed to provide incentive for a released defendant to return to 
court. Thus, the judges must predict several unknowns simulta-
neously: the risk of crime or FTA, the likelihood the defendant 
will post a given amount of bail, and the impact that bail will 
have on the defendant’s pretrial misconduct. A defendant who 
was detained pretrial is not necessarily someone who the judge 
considered higher risk than one who was released. 
 
 125. Kleinberg et al., supra note 7. 
 126. Id. at 246. 
 127. See id. at 252–53 (describing the model). 
 128. See id. at 239. 
 129. See id. at 241. 
 130. See id. at 270–71. 
 131. See id. at 245–46 (“Judges may be making mistakes in predicting either 
crime risk or ability to pay, which may complicate our ability to isolate mispre-
diction of risk.”). 
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Second, judges are likely to have more complicated prefer-
ences than the algorithm. For one, they may be taking into ac-
count factors other than risk. For example, a judge might find it 
inappropriate to detain someone on very minor charges, even if 
they pose a relatively high statistical risk of future offending.132 
Further, there are multiple types of risk that judges consider—
FTA, violent crime, drug crime, etc.—and judges are likely to 
vary in the extent to which they are concerned with each. Aggre-
gating multiple judges together means that even if each were 
performing optimally according to his or her own preferences, a 
risk algorithm could outperform the group average on any single 
dimension.  
Third, the ability to compare the risk prediction tool to the 
judges’ intuition relies on assumptions about the crime risk of 
detained defendants. The policy simulation cited in the introduc-
tion to this Article—which states that, by adopting risk assess-
ment, the detention rate can be lowered by 41.9% without affect-
ing the crime rate—is based on the assumption that the crime 
rate of a detained defendant will be the same as the crime rate 
of a released defendant with similar visible characteristics (i.e., 
criminal record, etc.).133 This is almost certainly not true. For 
more serious crimes, where release rates are low, the released 
defendants will not be at all representative. 
These three problems—using an imperfect proxy as a meas-
ure for the human’s prediction,134 the implausible assumption 
 
 132. Several authors have found some evidence of this. See, e.g., Kleinberg 
et al., supra note 7, at 284 (“Judges are most likely to release high-risk people 
if their current charge is minor, such as a misdemeanor, and are more likely to 
detain low-risk people if their current charge is more serious.”). In fact, it is not 
uncommon to find policies that declare a presumption of pretrial release for de-
fendants who are facing relatively low-level charges, and thus would be unlikely 
to receive carceral sentences. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.135(1) (West 
2012) (declaring that those facing charges for which a conviction may result in 
presumptive probation should be released on his or her own recognizance or 
unsecured bond); KRASNER, supra note 102 (ending the practice of requesting 
cash bond for certain low-level offenses). This is even though research suggests 
that the seriousness of the current charge is a relatively poor predictor of future 
criminal activity, compared to factors such as prior convictions and age. See 
Kristin Bechtel et al., Identifying the Predictors of Pretrial Failure: A Meta-
Analysis, 75 FED. PROB. 78, 80–82 (2011) (stating numerous factors, including 
age and prior convictions, as being strongly correlated with re-arrest or failure 
to appear; however, the current offense itself was not significantly correlated 
with re-arrest or failure to appear). 
 133. See Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 271. 
 134. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Ac-
curate About Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 784 (1994) 
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that the human’s objective is exactly the same as the algo-
rithm’s,135 and an inability to measure accuracy because of miss-
ing or distorted outcome variables136—are common to most at-
tempts to compare human and algorithmic prediction.137 
Kleinberg et al. are aware of these confounds to the research de-
sign and make some attempts to address them in their paper.138 
They make some headway in providing evidence that the con-
founds cannot entirely explain away their results. However, 
these are not minor issues, but rather fundamental challenges 
to the research design. Ultimately, it is unclear how much more 
accurate the risk prediction algorithm is, if at all. 
In January 2018, an undergraduate computer-studies major 
and her advisor published a study that challenged many com-
monly-held beliefs about the relative accuracy of human intui-
tion and algorithmic predictions.139 Using an experimental 
method that was explicitly set up as a horse race between survey 
respondents and algorithmic risk assessment models, they found 
no evidence that algorithms were more accurate in predicting re-
cidivism than human beings.140 The survey participants were 
Mechanical Turk users: random people who were unlikely to 
have much criminal justice experience.141 They were given short 
 
(“One commonly used approach [for quantifying decision-maker accuracy in pre-
dicting future violence] . . . assumes that clinicians’ recommendations about 
hospitalization or release represent judgments about the likelihood of future 
violence.”). 
 135. Kleinberg et al. call this “omitted-payoff bias.” See Kleinberg et al., su-
pra note 7, at 272 (“One potential concern is that when making release deci-
sions, judges might have additional objectives beyond the outcome the algo-
rithm is predicting.”). 
 136. In observational studies, actions taken to ameliorate risk (i.e., incarcer-
ation, supervision, rehabilitative programming, secured bail, etc.) make it hard 
to estimate what the risk level would have been in the absence of such interven-
tions. See, e.g., Jongbin Jung et al., Algorithmic Decision Making in the Pres-
ence of Unmeasured Confounding (May 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with arxiv.org) (“For example, in the judicial context we only observe 
whether or not a particular defendant failed to appear at trial given the action 
the judge actually took (i.e., requiring bail or not); we do not observe what would 
have happened under the alternative judicial action.” (emphasis added)). 
 137. While a full literature review is beyond the scope of this Article, these 
problems can also be found in Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, Jung et al., 
supra note 136, and many of the older papers cited in Grove et al., supra note 
121. 
 138. Kleinberg et al., supra note 7, at 273–80. 
 139. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Pre-
dicting Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2018). 
 140. Id. at 1. 
 141. Id. 
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descriptions of defendants that contained the following infor-
mation: sex, age, charge, degree of charge, number of prior con-
victions, and number of prior juvenile felony and misdemeanor 
charges.142 In some versions of the experiment the authors also 
provided the defendant’s race.143 The respondents were asked to 
predict whether or not the defendant would be rearrested within 
two years.144 Since the survey respondent’s payment was five 
times greater if their accuracy level was above a certain bar, they 
were incentivized to be as accurate as possible.145 Each respond-
ent provided predictions on fifty cases and received real-time 
feedback on whether their prediction was correct as well as the 
overall accuracy rate.146 The authors compared the accuracy of 
the survey respondents against several algorithms: COMPAS, a 
prominent risk assessment tool offered by a for-profit company; 
a non-linear machine-learning prediction algorithm that the au-
thors developed themselves; and a simple logistic regression pre-
diction tool built off of only two inputs, age and prior convic-
tions.147 The authors found no evidence that any of the 
algorithms could outperform the predictions of a random group 
of online respondents.148 
This study is notable because it is less vulnerable to some of 
the confounds listed above. Instead of relying on an imperfect 
prediction-proxy, in a setting where the humans may have had 
objectives other than risk, this study was designed to elicit spe-
cific predictions about a well-defined outcome. This enables a 
cleaner accuracy comparison between the survey respondents 
and the COMPAS algorithm. 
Like any study, one should wait and see if it can be repli-
cated in other contexts and with other data sets before drawing 
firm conclusions. And even if the results themselves are inter-
nally valid, one cannot infer too much about judges based on a 
Mechanical Turk study. The contexts are very different. On the 
one hand, one might expect that judges, who are not only experts 
but have a lot more information about the case, should be able 
to outperform a random online participant who has only seven 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. Id. at 1. 
 145. Id. at 4. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 3. 
 148. Id. 
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data points per defendant. On the other hand, the extra infor-
mation that judges have may lead them to put too much weight 
on extraneous factors, like whether a defendant is sufficiently 
polite. Furthermore, judges do not get real-time feedback about 
their accuracy. Nonetheless, these results certainly temper the 
expectation that algorithms provide a substantial improvement 
over human intuition. 
Algorithms have proven themselves highly successful in 
many contexts—outperforming world masters in chess and Go, 
for instance149—so it remains reasonable to think that a well-
built actuarial tool can out-predict a judge on future offending. 
This is likely to be particularly true in the rapid, assembly-line 
style proceedings that characterize many bail hearings. How-
ever, the margin of improvement remains unclear. 
B. RACIAL DISPARITIES AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
The last couple of years have seen increased debate about 
whether risk assessment tools will worsen racial disparities in 
criminal justice.150 Risk assessment proponents argue that the 
objective rankings of a risk tool will be less biased than the sub-
jective evaluations of potentially-racist judges.151 Critics counter 
that the risk tools themselves may be racially biased.152 Some of 
the confusion lies in a lack of clear language about what consti-
tutes racial bias in risk assessment.153 For the purposes of this 
Article, I consider a tool to be racially biased if it systematically 
 
 149. See, e.g., Deep Learning Machine Teaches Itself Chess in 72 Hours, Plays 
at International Master Level, MIT TECH. REVIEW (Sep. 14, 2015), https://www 
.technologyreview.com/s/541276/deep-learning-machine-teaches-itself-chess-in 
-72-hours-plays-at-international-master/.  
 150. For a brief summary of the debate, see Justin Breaux et al., Could Risk 
Assessment Contribute to Racial Disparity in the Justice System?, URB. INST.: 
URB. WIRE (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/could-risk 
-assessment-contribute-racial-disparity-justice-system (acknowledging the con-
cern that using risk prediction assessment could “exacerbate class and race dis-
parities in the criminal justice system”). 
 151. See, e.g., Robert D. Hoge, Standardized Instruments for Assessing Risk 
and Need in Youthful Offenders, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 380, 387 (2002) (not-
ing the use of standardized risk and need assessment tools would “significantly 
reduce the operations of individual biases . . .”). 
 152. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of 
Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015) (explaining the tie be-
tween race, prior criminal history, and the assessment of risk through risk in-
struments). 
 153. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting the various definitions 
of bias). 
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assigns higher risk scores to defendants from a particular race 
than their true risk warrants. (While true risk is hard to define 
or measure on the individual level, on the group level it refers to 
the average incidence of the predicted outcome.)154 This is how 
the term “bias” is used in statistics155 and is similar to the com-
mon language usage of the term.156 
Using this definition, there are a number of reasons why 
risk assessment tools could be biased against blacks.157 The most 
common argument is that inputs to risk assessment—prior con-
victions, prior incarceration sentences, education, employment, 
etc.—are themselves the result of racially disparate practices.158 
While two defendants may pose a similar crime risk, the defend-
ant living in a heavily-policed minority neighborhood is likely to 
have a lengthier criminal record and thus a higher risk score 
than one who lives in a less heavily-policed neighborhood.159 
Similarly, a risk algorithm that is trained to predict an outcome 
that is the result of racially disparate law enforcement or prose-
cution practices also incorporates bias into the algorithm.160 
While these sources of potential bias almost certainly affect the 
risk assessment, they are hard to correct for, and few even try.161 
 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 10 n.45 (explaining that bias is a “deviation of a statisti-
cal calculation” from the “true value” of the item calculated); see also id. at 12 
(describing “true positive” as the correct prediction of an arrest). 
 155. “Systematic error or bias refers to deviations that are not due to chance 
alone. The simplest example occurs with a measuring device that is improperly 
calibrated so that it consistently overestimates (or underestimates) the meas-
urements by X units.” Penn State Eberly Coll. of Sci., Lesson 4: Bias and Ran-
dom Error, in STAT 509 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL TRIALS, https:// 
onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat509/node/26 (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 156. The online Oxford English Dictionary defines “bias” as “Inclination or 
prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to 
be unfair.” Bias, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/bias (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 157. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate 
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677–92 (2016) (discussing ways in which data 
mining can discriminate). 
 158. See Breaux et al., supra note 150 (explaining that black probationers 
have their probation revoked and are “subsequently incarcerated at much 
higher rates” than whites or Hispanics); Harcourt, supra note 152, at 240 
(“[R]eliance on criminal history has proven devastating to African American 
communities . . . .”). 
 159. See, e.g., CHRISTIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (acknowledging that 
“[r]acial discrimination takes place at every step of the criminal justice system,” 
including policing); Breaux et al., supra note 150 (noting that black individuals 
are “more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana use and possession”). 
 160. See Harcourt, supra note 152, at 238 (“[R]isk today has collapsed into 
prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.”). 
 161. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
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Actual rates of offending are unknown and the gap between be-
havior and criminal record can only be guessed at.  
Another place where bias can enter the risk tool is in the 
design of the instrument.162 In the simpler, checklist-style instru-
ments the designers choose both the inputs and the weights on 
the inputs. If a designer puts more weight on inputs that corre-
late with race than their crime-predictiveness warrants, the tool 
will be biased. In machine-learned risk assessment tools this 
type of bias is less of a concern. The weight the algorithm places 
on different inputs will generally reflect only the extent to which 
these inputs are predictive of what it is trained to predict. 
Empirical research on racial bias in risk assessment is both 
thin and recent. In 2016, ProPublica released a study that 
claimed to have found evidence that a proprietary risk assess-
ment tool called COMPAS, used to help make decisions about 
pretrial release in Broward County, Florida, was biased against 
black defendants.163 To support this claim, they show that “black 
defendants who did not recidivate over a two-year period were 
nearly twice as likely to be misclassified as higher risk compared 
to their white counterparts. . . .”164 In technical terms, this is a 
disparity in false positive rates, or the fraction of non-recidivat-
ing defendants who were ranked as high risk.165 Many research-
ers countered this argument with the point that disparate false 
positive rates will be present every time there are disparate 
rates of offending—and thus disparate average risk levels—
across groups.166 The intuition behind this is simple. A false pos-
itive rate is a ratio: the denominator is the total number of people 
 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal 
-sententcing (noting that the sentencing commission did not carry out risk score 
studies after a warning from the U. S. Attorney General that the risk scores 
may be biased). 
 162. See id. (explaining that, even after running statistical tests that “iso-
lated the effect of race from criminal history and recidivism, as well as from 
defendant’s age and gender,” black defendants were still seventy-seven percent 
“more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future violent 
crime”).  
 163. Id. (“There’s software used across the country to predict future crimi-
nals. And it’s biased against blacks.”). 
 164. Julia Angwin et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algo-
rithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we 
-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. 
 165. See Mayson, supra note 153 (explaining, briefly, the mechanics of a 
“false positive”). 
 166. See, e.g., William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating 
Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity, NORTHPOINTE, at 1, 8 (July 8, 2016), 
https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/compas-risk-scales 
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who do not recidivate and the numerator is the number of people 
who do not recidivate but are classified as high risk. As the risk 
level of a group increases, there will be fewer people who do not 
recidivate and more people who are labeled high risk.167 Since 
there are fewer non-recidivists, the denominator will decrease. 
Since there are more people labeled “high risk”—some fraction 
of which do not recidivate—the numerator increases. Thus, in 
simple mathematical terms, as the risk level goes up, the false 
positive rate will go up too. In other words, differing levels of 
offending will lead to disparate false positive rates even if we 
knew the true risk of each group and even if the tool is completely 
unbiased.168 In fact, when there are disparate base rates of of-
fending, one would have to program a risk tool to be biased (so 
that one group systematically gets a lower or higher risk classi-
fication than their true risk level warrants) in order to eradicate 
disparate false positive rates.169 
While ProPublica framed this as being about actuarial risk 
assessment,170 it is actually relevant to the entire project of using 
risk to make decisions in criminal justice. The key points apply 
equally regardless of how the risk evaluation was conducted: 
through proprietary black box risk assessment tools, transpar-
ent checklist instruments, or judges’ intuitive assessment of 
risk. If it is concerning that black defendants who do not recidi-
vate are more likely to be labeled high risk than white defend-
ants who do not recidivate (and there are plenty of reasons why 
 
-demonstrating-a (explaining that the false positive rates are a “natural conse-
quence of using unbiased scoring rules”); Jennifer L. Doleac & Megan Steven-
son, Are Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 22, 
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/are-criminal-risk 
-assessment-scores-racist (“Disparate false-positive rates will be present every 
time there are disparate rates of reoffending . . . .”). 
 167. See Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (explaining, briefly, the equa-
tion of the “false positive”). 
 168. While disparate impact is not inherently unfair, it can be unfair when 
the costs are born by a marginalized group and the benefits accrue to the domi-
nant group. The unfairness arises not from the disparate impact per se, but 
from the presumption that the benefits to the dominant group were given dis-
proportionate weight in the policy decision, while the costs to the marginalized 
group were discounted. 
 169. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination 
of Risk Scores, ARXIV (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf 
(showing that, except for in very specialized circumstances, achieving equal 
false positive rates would require a risk tool where the same risk classification 
would correspond with different levels of actual risk across the two groups).  
 170. See generally Angwin et al., supra note 164 (explaining the ProPublica 
study on risk assessment). 
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this should be concerning!), then this calls into question the en-
tire regime of using risk as a basis of restricting liberties, not 
simply actuarial risk assessment instruments.  
Disparate false positive rates are not a measure of racial 
bias under the definition used in this Article. Most other re-
searchers do not measure racial bias using disparate false posi-
tive rates either.171 Instead, they measure bias using predictive 
parity: similar recidivism rates among white and black defend-
ants with the same risk score.172 If a risk score is racially biased 
using the definition provided above, then the likelihood of com-
mitting crime would be lower for black defendants than it would 
be for white defendants with the same risk score. The company 
that owns COMPAS responded to ProPublica’s article by show-
ing that there is no evidence that the tool is biased using predic-
tive parity tests.173 Similar results have been found for the Post 
Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) in a detailed study of racial 
disparities and risk assessment.174 The PSA likewise shows pre-
dictive parity for white and black defendants,175 as does the Vir-
ginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI).176  
 
 171. See Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and 
Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 685 
(2016) (“There is substantial agreement on the empirical criteria that indicate 
when a test is . . . biased . . . the paramount indicator of test bias is predictive 
bias . . . .”). 
 172. See generally Dietrich et al., supra note 166, at 9 (explaining predictive 
parity in relation to risk score). 
 173. Id. at 2–3 (noting that if the “correct classifications statistics are used,” 
then claims of racial bias are “not supported”). 
 174. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 171, at 690 (stating that test findings 
were “generally consistent” with the hypothesis that there would be “little evi-
dence that the accuracy of the PCRA in predicting rearrest depends on whether 
offenders are Black or White”). 
 175. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SIX 
MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT – COURT KENTUCKY 1, 4 (2014), 
https://arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky 
-6-Month-Report.pdf [hereinafter FIRST SIX MONTHS]. This study has been re-
cently removed from the Arnold Foundation’s website but is on file with the 
author. Representatives of the Arnold Foundation explained that it was re-
moved due to concerns about the quality of the data used in the report. 
 176. See Mona J.E. Danner et al., Race and Gender Neutral Pretrial Risk 
Assessment, Release Recommendations, and Supervision: VPRAI and Praxis Re-
vised, LUMINOSITY, at 1, 8, https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/ 
files/publications/corrections/race-and-gender-neutral-pretrial-risk-assessment 
-release-recommendations-and-supervision.pdf (“Taken as a whole, the anal-
yses support the neutrality of the VPRAI in classifying People of Color and 
Whites by risk of pretrial failure.”). 
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However, there are reasons to question the predictive parity 
approach. First, it is impossible to test for predictive parity in 
rates of reoffending; one can only test for predictive parity in 
something visible, like arrest or conviction. Given the differences 
in how different neighborhoods are policed—as well as the many 
other opportunities for racial bias or racial disparity to affect the 
likelihood of arrest or conviction—a group of black defendants 
who are rearrested at the same rate as a group of white defend-
ants may have committed fewer crimes.177 The race gap between 
the rate of offense and rate of rearrest is thought to be lower for 
violent crimes than for less serious crimes.178 The Skeem & Low-
enkamp study on racial bias in the PCRA focuses primarily on 
predictive parity for violent crime rearrest for this express rea-
son.179 
A second concern with using predictive parity as a measure 
is that the rate of reoffending does not directly measure the risk 
of reoffending at the time the risk was evaluated.180 Actual 
reoffending is a joint combination of a person’s propensity to 
commit crime and the opportunities and incentives that she 
faces.181 Risk evaluations, both formal and informal, influence 
these opportunities and incentives.182 In particular, they influ-
ence the likelihood that a defendant will be incarcerated, super-
vised, provided treatment, and so forth.183 If judges treat black 
defendants differently than white defendants this would bias 
measures of predictive parity. For example, if judges are more 
 
 177. See Breaux et al., supra note 150 (noting that black individuals are 
“more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana use and possession,” de-
spite similar rates of use).  
 178. See, e.g., Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 171, at 690 (noting that “vi-
olent arrests” are “the most unbiased criterion available” since they involve less 
police discretion than do “victimless” crimes). 
 179. Id. at 690 (describing why they chose risk of violent crime as the main 
focus of their analysis). 
 180. See Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (“Recidivism rates do not tell 
us what a person’s propensity to commit another crime was at the time the risk 
score was calculated.”).  
 181. See Shawn Bushway & Jeffrey Smith, Sentencing Using Statistical 
Treatment Rules: What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIM-
INOLOGY 377, 378 (2007) (“[I]t is impossible without additional strong assump-
tions to distinguish the ‘true’ behavior of individual offenders from the behavior 
that results from their non-random treatment within the existing system.”). 
 182. See id. (explaining that “judges, prosecutors, parole boards and other 
actors in the criminal justice system” use the “information available to them,” 
formal or informal, to “assign punishments”). 
 183. See id.; see also Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (noting that “risk 
scores influence sentencing, and sentencing influences recidivism”). 
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likely to assign white defendants to enter an effective drug treat-
ment program, their rate of reoffending will be lower than black 
defendants who were less likely to be assigned to the effective 
program.184 
Determining whether a risk tool is racially biased is proba-
bly redundant. As Princeton computer scientist Aylin Caliskan 
says, “[M]achines are trained on human data. And humans are 
biased.”185 The important question is whether the use of actuar-
ial risk assessment tools results in more disparate outcomes 
than the status quo, or other viable alternatives. Outside of the 
research presented in this study, the empirical research on this 
is next to non-existent.186 
C. RESEARCH ON THE IMPACTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
The discourse around risk assessment has focused primarily 
on the tools themselves.187 But risk assessments are merely 
tools, and their impact will depend on how they are used. A va-
riety of contextual and policy details are influential: the amount 
of judicial discretion allowed, the judge’s incentive structure, the 
fraction of defendants in each risk classification, the specific ac-
tion-directives associated with each risk classification, the court 
culture, etc.188 Even if risk assessments are racially biased, their 
use may result in lower racial disparities than the status quo. 
 
 184. See Doleac & Stevenson, supra note 166 (discussing the interplay be-
tween risk score and court sentencing). 
 185. Brian Resnick, How Artificial Intelligence Learns to Be Racist, VOX 
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/4/17/15322378/ 
how-artificial-intelligence-learns-how-to-be-racist. 
 186. See THE JUSTICE POLICY INST., REDUCING DISPROPORTIONATE MINOR-
ITY CONFINEMENT: THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON SUCCESS STORY AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS (2002), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/ 
documents/multnomah.pdf (outlining the only study that the author is aware of 
that could even tentatively be taken as evidence on how risk assessment in prac-
tice affects racial disparities relative to the status quo). 
 187. This is starting to change. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & John Mo-
nahan, Judging Risk (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 2018–44), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3190403 (proposing a regulatory framework for the use of risk 
assessment); Koepke & Robinson, supra note 86 (highlighting the importance of 
the decision-making framework around risk assessments).  
 188. See, e.g., Joel Miller & Carrie Maloney, Practitioner Compliance with 
Risk/Needs Assessment Tools: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 40 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 716, 719 (2003) (explaining how practitioners may not 
complete the risk assessment tools, may carelessly use the tools, manipulate the 
tools, or not adhere to tool recommendations). 
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Even if risk assessment tools are significantly better than hu-
mans at predicting future offending, that does not automatically 
mean that their adoption will lead to large benefits. 
Risk assessments are usually used as a supplement to hu-
man discretion; judges or other criminal justice authorities re-
tain wide latitude to make the final decision.189 Discretion is jus-
tified in principle because the individual facts of a case may 
make a defendant higher or lower risk than her risk score indi-
cates.190 Ideally, discretion is used only to correct a mistaken risk 
evaluation. In practice, however, it may be hard to identify when 
individual factors are influential enough to render the risk as-
sessment score incorrect. Judges may ignore the risk tool in 
cases where it is correct, or place too much credence on it when 
it is incorrect.191 The evidence suggests that judges and criminal 
justice practitioners do not have a lot of faith in risk assessment 
tools. In a recent survey of judicial attitudes toward risk assess-
ment at sentencing, less than 10% thought that the actuarial 
tools would predict better than judges.192 A survey of more than 
two thousand probation and parole officers found that even 
among the most compliant officers, “practitioners routinely ex-
ercise substantial discretion to choose interventions that are 
more restrictive or intensive than the tool recommends.”193 With 
such low confidence and adherence, risk assessment may only 
change behavior in exceptional circumstances. Are these circum-
stances in which the tool provides significant informational gain 
over human intuition? If not, then the tool will provide little ben-
efit in practice. 
Expanding upon this theme, judges may use the risk assess-
ment tools differently for white defendants than they do for black 
defendants.194 A judge may think a black defendant is higher risk 
 
 189. See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 187, at 7 (“[T]he process [of 
adopting risk assessment] has often been ad hoc and involves conveying risk 
information to judges and other decisionmakers, who retain traditional discre-
tion.”). 
 190. See id. at 13–14 (noting the concern that certain individual factors, such 
as how common or uncommon the offense and time at which the offense was 
committed, could lead to inaccurate predictions by risk assessment instru-
ments). 
 191. See id. at 19–20 (describing the instances when judges could have as-
signed alternative sentences to those categorized as “least violent offenders” but 
opted not to). 
 192. See Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 120, at 10. 
 193. Miller & Maloney, supra note 188, at 728.  
 194. See, e.g., Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 280 (“[R]ace and ethnicity 
can influence practitioners’ attribution of risk factors to offenders . . . .”). 
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than their risk score indicates because of racist stereotypes. Al-
ternatively, she may think a black defendant is lower risk than 
is indicated by the risk score because she is aware that racially 
disparate policing practices contributed to his previous arrests. 
While the question of racial disparity is often posed as a choice 
between biased instruments or biased judges, in practice, the im-
portant question is “how do the two interact?” 
The way the criminal justice administrator (judge, parole 
board member, etc.) uses a risk tool is not just an idiosyncratic 
function of her personality—it is likely to be influenced by the 
institutional background and her incentive structure.195 Some-
one who is elected will be attuned to the concerns of re-election 
and may be wary of taking actions that would lead to a loss of 
political support. Someone who is appointed is likely to have con-
cerns about re-appointment, and will take efforts to please the 
appointing body. These career concerns will play out differently 
if there is transparency and accountability in the way the tool is 
used. If there is little oversight, the judge will be more likely to 
follow her own sensibility.196 
The impacts of risk assessment depend also on numerous 
policy decisions. First, the jurisdiction must choose whether to 
report actual statistical risk, (i.e., a defendant has an x percent 
chance of y happening within z months) or risk labeling (i.e., low, 
moderate, or high).197 Most jurisdictions use a risk labeling ap-
proach.198 This approach requires defining the cutoffs in statistic 
risk that determine each classification.199 In other words, it re-
quires a normative decision about what fraction of defendants 
should receive the stigmatic high-risk label versus more the be-
nign low-risk label.200 These risk labels then translate, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, into action-directives. Many jurisdictions 
 
 195. See generally Miller & Maloney, supra note 188, at 720 (describing rea-
sons for practitioner noncompliance with risk assessment tools, including the 
desire to “obtain a desirable outcome, or avoid an adverse one”). 
 196. See generally Hannah-Moffat, supra note 79, at 285–86 (discussing 
transparency in the use of a risk instrument). 
 197. See Daniel A. Kraus et al., Risk Assessment Communication Difficulties: 
An Empirical Examination of the Effects of Categorical Versus Probabilistic 
Risk Communication in Sexually Violent Predator Decisions, BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (explaining categori-
cal and numerical-based predictive probabilities).  
 198. See id. (manuscript at 4) (noting that judges seem to prefer categorical 
over numeric-based estimates).  
 199. See id. (manuscript at 6) (describing the range of categories in risk la-
beling). 
 200. See id.  
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implement specific schemas for how defendants in different risk 
classifications are to be treated. For instance, it is common in the 
pretrial context to direct judges to grant non-financial release for 
low-risk defendants, conditional release (with supervision or low 
cash bond) for moderate-risk defendants, and detention for high 
risk defendants.201 Even if the policy is not explicit about what 
actions should be taken with each group, there may still be im-
plicit recommendations.202 High-risk defendants should be 
treated as high-risk defendants are supposed to be treated in 
that particular jurisdiction; usually this entails greater re-
strictions on liberty.203 A jurisdiction must decide whether the 
decision-maker has full discretion when it comes to following the 
action-directives, or whether certain actions are banned/re-
quired based on the risk score.204 It must decide whether to im-
pose any costs, in terms of time, convenience, or otherwise, of 
deviating from the action-directive. Finally, a jurisdiction must 
decide what degree of transparency and accountability to require 
in the use of risk assessment tools.205  
An evaluation of the impacts of risk assessment in practice 
will always be a joint evaluation of the tool itself, the manner in 
which it is used, and the policy structure it is embedded in. Such 
evaluations are very scarce. Outside of the results reported in 
this Article, I am aware of only two rigorous, third party studies 
that compare outcomes when a risk assessment tool is being 
used to outcomes under the status quo method of making deci-
sions. A study by Richard Berk showed that parole board mem-
bers in Pennsylvania did not change their release decisions very 
much when risk assessments were available.206 Berk found ten-
tative evidence that the risk assessment tool lowered recidivism 
 
 201. See, e.g., SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 
1, 31 (2008), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ 
Reducing-Racial-Disparity-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System-A-Manual-for 
-Practitioners-and-Policymakers.pdf (describing the pretrial risk scale that was 
used in Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District, which called for variated release 
conditions based on level of risk). 
 202. See, e.g., Miller & Maloney, supra note 188, at 720 (explaining how some 
policies may allow practitioner override of the tool recommendation). 
 203. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 161 (noting that risk scores can de-
cide bond amounts to more “fundamental decisions about defendants’ freedom”). 
 204. See, e.g., Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 120, at 4 (pointing out the 
possibility of practitioner discretion over using the risk results).  
 205. See id. at 6 (noting that individual jurisdictions oft evaluate possible 
levels of transparency when deciding if to implement a risk-assessment tool). 
 206. Berk, supra note 11, at 203 tbl.2. 
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rates, but cautioned against firm conclusions due to weakness in 
the research design.207 A different paper by Berk and coauthors 
used a large randomized control trial to evaluate different meth-
ods of assigning convicts to prison.208 Inmates in the treatment 
group were assigned to prisons by the machine learning risk as-
sessment tool: higher-risk defendants were assigned to higher-
security prisons.209 In the control group, inmates were assigned 
to prisons using the existing scoring system.210 There was no de-
crease in inmate misconduct for defendants who were assigned 
to facilities using the risk assessment tool,211 but the misconduct 
was shifted toward higher-security facilities, suggesting that the 
tool was effective in predicting misconduct.212 The little evidence 
that is available about the impacts of pretrial risk assessment in 
particular come from detail-light, non-academic reports usually 
put out by the organization who designed or implemented the 
tool. Two of the most commonly cited reports use data from Ken-
tucky.213 One is a report put out by Kentucky Pretrial Services 
 
 207. See id. at 213 (noting that rearrests “look to have declined” after “fore-
casts and reliabilities were regularly made available,” but that the treatment 
affect estimates may have been inflated due to practice changes when the learn-
ing forecasts and reliabilities were introduced). 
 208. Richard A. Berk et al., A Randomized Experiment Testing Inmate Clas-
sification Systems, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 215, 216 (2003). 
 209. See id. at 219 (explaining that a goal of the new classification system 
was to “better predict inmate misconduct and place them accordingly”). 
 210. See id. at 216 (explaining the scoring system in place by the Center for 
Disease Control). 
 211. See id. at 232–33 (noting that there lacked “any important differences 
in misconduct” between the experimental and control groups). 
 212. Id. at 233 (“[T]he new system shifted the misconduct into the higher 
security levels . . . .”). This study is better thought of as an evaluation of super-
vision levels than an evaluation of risk assessment, since it does not compare 
decision making with risk assessment against the status quo decision-making 
method. Virginia is also cited as an example of successful use of risk assessment 
in sentencing, but the studies cited to support this claim also do not compare 
decision making with and without risk assessment and thus cannot demon-
strate whether risk assessment brought any improvement. See BRIAN J. 
OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE 
EVALUATION 15 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196815.pdf; 
Mathew Kleiman et al., Using Risk Assessment to Inform Sentencing Decisions 
for Nonviolent Offenders in Virginia, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 106, 112 (2007). 
 213. A third study also analyzes HB 463, but relies heavily on data from 
Kentucky Pretrial Services. JOHN D. MINTON, JR. ET AL., REPORT ON IMPACT OF 
HOUSE BILL 463: OUTCOMES, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2012). 
This study argues that judicial discretion has undermined the effectiveness of 
HB 463. See also Robert Veldman, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis 
of the Impact of House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its Implementa-
tion, 102 KY. L. J. 777, 778 (2013) (“To improve the bill’s effectiveness and keep 
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evaluating HB 463.214 Another is a report put out by the Laura 
& John Arnold Foundation evaluating the adoption of their risk 
assessment tool, the PSA.215 
Both reports are brief and show simply that the average de-
tention and pretrial rearrest rates are lower in the period after 
the risk assessment change than they were in the period be-
fore.216 (The Kentucky Pretrial Services report also claims that 
FTA rates were lowered.217) While these findings are often cited 
as evidence that risk assessment can jointly decrease both de-
tention rates and crime, the articles provide little evidence that 
the changes cited come from the risk assessment. For instance, 
it is possible that there was a steady decline in both detention 
rates and rearrest that started long before the period of analysis 
and had nothing to do with risk assessment. However, there is a 
more fundamental reason why the statistics presented in these 
reports cannot be interpreted as an evaluation of risk assess-
ment. Both reports were published very soon after the change 
they are analyzing and before all the cases in the sample were 
resolved.218 The analysts do not correct for the fact that defend-
ants whose cases were not yet resolved had, on average, less time 
 
with the legislative intent, judicial discretion should be curtailed to prevent the 
dominance of subjective decision making.”). 
 214. MINTON ET AL., supra note 213. 
 215. FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 1. This study has recently been 
removed from the Arnold Foundation’s website but is on file with the author. 
Representatives of the Arnold Foundation explained that it was removed due to 
concerns about the quality of the data used in the report. Research Report: Re-
sults from the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment – Court in Ken-
tucky, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www 
.arnoldfoundation.org/research-report-results-first-six-months-public-safety- 
assessment-court-kentucky. 
 216. MARK HEYERLEY, KY. PRETRIAL SERVS., PRETRIAL REFORM IN KEN-
TUCKY 6 (2013), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/ 
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=95c0fae5-fe2e-72e0-15a2 
-84ed28155d0a; FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 215, at 1. 
 217. HEYERLEY, supra note 216, at 6. 
 218. The publication date of HEYERLEY, supra note 216 is June 2012. The 
post–HB 463 period is the year from June 2011–June 2012. HEYERLEY, supra 
note 216, at 6. Thus, the post–HB 463 period includes many cases which have 
not yet been adjudicated. The publication date of FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 
175 is July 2014. The post-PSA period extends from July–December 2013 while 
the comparison group includes cases from July 2009–July 2013. FIRST SIX 
MONTHS, supra note 175, at 1. Only 83% of the released defendants whose cases 
originated in the six-month post-PSA period were resolved by the date of the 
Arnold publication, compared with 97% of the pre-PSA cases. The report con-
tains a footnote acknowledging that pretrial rearrest rates may rise since some 
cases remain open. In fact, the fraction of released defendants who were ar-
rested pretrial rose an additional 2.5% since the publication of the report, 
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in which to be rearrested than defendants whose original arrest 
occurred earlier.219 This artificially deflates the rearrest rate for 
defendants whose arrest occurred after the adoption of the risk 
assessment. In statistical terms, this is called “truncation bias,” 
and it erroneously made it appear like risk assessment led to 
lower instances of misconduct.220 Part IV of this Article provides 
evidence that neither the 2011 law nor the adoption of the PSA 
led to a lower rate of pretrial rearrest or FTA.221 
It is not uncommon to find statistics from other jurisdictions 
cited as evidence that pretrial risk assessment led to a decrease 
in detention rates, FTAs, and crime, but the research supporting 
these claims are as tenuous—or more so—than the studies cited 
above. The Arnold Foundation released a report stating that the 
use of their risk assessment tool in Lucas County, Ohio, led to a 
doubling in the number of defendants granted non-financial re-
lease and a decrease in pretrial rearrest and FTA, but the one-
page press release contains little detail besides that.222 A court 
document shows that the pretrial detention rate actually in-
creased in Lucas County after risk assessment was adopted.223 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina is also supposed to have 
seen a dramatic drop in their jail population after adopting the 
 
demonstrating that the PSA did not lead to a reduction in pretrial crime. For a 
discussion of the increase in pretrial arrests, see infra note 292 and accompa-
nying text.  
 219. External pressures forced a rapid release of this report despite signifi-
cant concerns about the data that were expressed by the head of Kentucky Pre-
trial Services. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Of-
ficer, Ky. Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017). 
 220. The same error is responsible for the erroneous conclusion in HEYER-
LEY, supra note 216, at 6 that rates of non-appearance were lower after HB 463 
than before. The Arnold Foundation report acknowledges in a footnote that the 
post-PSA rearrest and non-appearance rates may rise since some cases re-
mained open. FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 2 n.2. However, in conver-
sations with them, they expressed the opinion that the differences in results are 
mostly due to differences in how the data were pulled and processed. 
 221. The Arnold Foundation also released a report stating that non-financial 
release is up, and crime and FTAs are down in Lucas County, Ohio after imple-
menting the PSA. See New Data: Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Works to Reduce 
Crime, Increase Court Appearances, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 8, 
2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/new-data-pretrial-risk-assessment 
-tool-works-reduce-crime-increase-court-appearances [hereinafter LAURA & 
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND, New Data]. There are not enough details in the report to 
assess these claims. See id.  
 222. See id. 
 223. Notice of Filing Copy of Presentation Assessing Impact of Public Safety 
Assessment at 12 app., Jones v. Wittenberg, No. 3:70CV388, 2017 WL 1422345 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
08/Lucas-County-court-filing.pdf. 
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Arnold Foundation’s risk assessment, but the evidence purport-
ing to support this consists entirely of slides taken from two Pow-
erPoint presentations.224 Multnomah County, Oregon is cited as 
a successful example of risk assessment leading not only to lower 
detention rates among juveniles, but also lower racial disparities 
in detention.225 However, the authors of the study do not attrib-
ute the change to risk assessment per se.226 A study in Virginia 
states that training pretrial officers in how to use a risk assess-
ment tool led to increased release recommendations, increased 
release, and lower misconduct.227 The study claims that agencies 
were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, which 
suggests that it may be more rigorous than previous research.228 
However, the study was conducted by the same company that 
designed the risk tool (raising conflict of interest concerns) and 
did not provide enough detail to verify the reliability of the re-
search design.229 
 
 224. Both CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 21 and 
JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUC-
ING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS 28 (2015), https://www 
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20 
Report%20062515.pdf state that risk assessment led to a drop in incarceration 
in Mecklenburg County, but PowerPoint slides are the only references cited in 
these papers that directly support this claim. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 37 n.182; EAGLIN & SOLOMON, supra, at 52 n.91. 
 225. VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., RE-
DUCING DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: THE MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY, OREGON SUCCESS STORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 13–14 (2002), http:// 
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/multnomah.pdf. 
 226. Id. at 15–16 (“It is difficult to assess what any one detention reform 
strategy (alternatives to incarceration, objective risk assessments, expedited 
case processing, sanctions grid for VOPs) or explicit DMC reduction strategy 
(diversity training, additional public defender resources, staff diversification, 
data collection and research, new coalitions with other agencies and groups, di-
versification of the delivery system) made the difference in Multnomah.”). 
 227. MONA J.E. DANNER ET AL., LUMINOSITY, INC., RISK-BASED PRETRIAL 
RELEASE RECOMMENDATION AND SUPERVISION GUIDELINES 1–2 (2015), https:// 
www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/corrections/risk 
-based-pretrial-release-recommendation-and-supervision-guidelines.pdf. 
 228. There were twenty-nine agencies randomized. Id. at 4. Presumably 
these agencies varied in size and were associated with different regions and re-
gional practices. A typical RCT where randomization was conducted over a 
small number of groups would show evidence about the extent to which out-
comes differed across treatment and control groups before the experimental in-
tervention occurred. If the outcomes differed across treatment and control be-
fore the intervention, then post-intervention differences in outcomes cannot be 
attributed to the intervention. 
 229. See DANNER ET AL., supra note 227, at 3–4. 
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New Jersey has recently implemented dramatic reform to 
its pretrial system.230 They shifted from a traditional money bail 
system to one in which detention is only authorized after a thor-
ough hearing with evidence, discovery, and counsel present.231 
Risk assessment is used to help determine the level of pretrial 
supervision and to suggest candidates for pretrial custody.232 
New Jersey has seen a dramatic decline in the rates of pretrial 
detention since bail reform was implemented.233 The impact on 
pretrial crime and FTAs is still unknown.234 
In sum, there is a sore lack of research on the impacts of risk 
assessment in practice. There is no evidence on how the use of 
risk assessment affects racial disparities. There is no evidence 
that the adoption of risk assessment has led to dramatic im-
provements in either incarceration rates or crime without ad-
versely affecting the other margin. The research on whether it 
should theoretically (due to improvements in predictive accu-
racy) is far from definitive. Nonetheless, it is a broadly held be-
lief that the adoption of risk assessment tools will lead to clear 
improvements in the efficiency of criminal justice.235  
III.  THE IMPACTS OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
KENTUCKY   
This Part provides some of the first rigorous empirical evi-
dence on the impacts of pretrial risk assessment in practice. It 
provides important information about risk assessment’s effects 
 
 230. Hon. Glenn A. Grant, Acting Administrative Director of the Courts, Re-
marks Before the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee 2 (May 4, 
2017). 
 231. Id. at 3. 
 232. Id. at 3–4.  
 233. Joe Hernandez, N.J.’s Jail Population Dropped 10 Percent in Two 
Months After It Scrapped Cash Bail, WHYY (Mar. 13, 2017), https://whyy.org/ 
articles/njs-jail-population-dropped-10-percent-in-two-months-after-it 
-scrapped-cash-bail. 
 234. See id.  
 235. See, e.g., PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 119, at 22 (“[T]here is a 
growing professional consensus that the careful and ethical implementation of 
risk assessment tools can facilitate improved criminal justice outcomes.”); Anne 
Milgram et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness 
in Pretrial Decision Making, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 216, 219 (2015) (“[J]udges’ use 
of [risk assessment] instruments has helped them make pretrial release deci-
sions that have reduced pretrial crime, kept dangerous offenders off our streets, 
and reduced the number of low-risk defendants detained before trial.”); Skeem 
& Lowenkamp, supra note 171, at 680 (“One way to begin unwinding mass in-
carceration without compromising public safety is to use risk assessment in-
struments in sentencing and corrections.”). 
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in a state that has been held up as a leader in pretrial reform, as 
well as insight about a risk assessment tool that has been widely 
adopted in other jurisdictions. It also serves as an empirical case 
study through which to explore, as is done in Part IV, the myriad 
ways that the impacts of risk assessment in practice may be dif-
ferent, and more complicated, than previously thought. Such dif-
ferences underline the importance of constantly evaluating new 
methods: a habit that is too rarely present in criminal justice 
despite the lip service paid to evidence-based practices. 
A. OVERVIEW OF PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN KENTUCKY 
Kentucky is noted as an early adopter of pretrial risk assess-
ment tools and is often cited as an example for other jurisdictions 
to follow.236 California’s bail reform efforts have been modeled 
after Kentucky’s system.237 An amicus brief signed by sixty-
seven current and former district and state’s attorneys, as well 
as other high-ranking criminal justice officials, described Ken-
tucky’s use of pretrial risk assessment as “impressive” and “very 
effective.”238 The Arnold Foundation’s risk tool, the PSA, was de-
veloped and piloted in Kentucky.239 It has since been adopted in 
forty jurisdictions including three entire states, three of the larg-
est cities, and two of the largest jail systems.240 
Kentucky has had an innovative pretrial system for many 
years. It is known as one of only four states that have outlawed 
the commercial bail industry.241 It has used some sort of risk as-
sessment instrument since 1976.242 Whereas most states either 
lack pretrial services or have locally-organized agencies in only 
the largest cities, Kentucky’s pretrial services operate 
statewide.243 They have earned both national and local respect 
 
 236. See supra note 18 (demonstrating that Kentucky’s use of pretrial risk 
assessments is an example for other jurisdictions). 
 237. Young, supra note 19. 
 238. See Brief of Current and Former District and State’s Attorneys, State’ 
Attorneys General, United States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attor-
neys, and Department of Justice Officials as Amici Curiae supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellees at 9, 10 n.8, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706 (S.D. Tex. 
2016) (No. H-16-1414), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 239. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., New Data, supra note 221, at 3, 5. 
 240. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 241. JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL 
BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUS-
TICE 40 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/_ 
for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf. 
 242. HEYERLEY, supra note 216, at 10. 
 243. Id. at 3.  
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for their adoption of evidence-based practices, their low FTA and 
pretrial crime rates, and their rigorous data collection.244  
In 2011, Kentucky passed a major criminal justice reform 
bill: House Bill 463 .245 As far as pretrial issues are concerned, 
the “most significant advancement [of HB 463] is the mandatory 
use of a ‘research-based, validated assessment tool’ to measure a 
defendant’s risk of flight or of posing a risk to the public.”246 Be-
fore HB 463, use of the pretrial risk assessment tool was op-
tional.247 Judges who were not interested in the tool were not 
required to look at it, and many did not use it at all.248 HB 463 
made consideration of the risk assessment a mandatory part of 
determining bond.249 It delineated a specific action-directive for 
low- and moderate-risk defendants: immediate release without 
cash bail.250 Defendants were granted a $100-per-day credit to-
ward the bail amount for each day they spend in jail,251 the bail 
amount was capped at the maximum fine for crimes that were 
punishable by fine only,252 and nonmonetary release was recom-
mended for defendants charged with crimes where the presump-
tive punishment is probation.253 However, nowhere in HB 463 
was judicial discretion limited. In a Kentucky Supreme Court 
order that clarified how judges should respond to HB 463, this 
 
 244. See Jamie Neal, State Pretrial Services Leader Receives 2012 Public Ad-
vocate Award, KY. CT. JUST. (Oct. 2, 2012) http://courts.ky.gov/pages/newsroom 
.aspx?viewMode=PressRelease&pressReleaseGUID=%7BD15D83C0-10F7 
-4E92-9CB1-A775C14F2DCC%7D. The head of Kentucky Pretrial Services re-
ceived Kentucky’s 2012 Public Advocate Award for her work promoting pretrial 
justice. Id. 
 245. Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, ch. 2, 2011 Ky. Acts 5.  
 246. Damon Preston, Changes in Criminal Law or Criminal Procedure in 
HB 463, in CRIMINAL LAW REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR OF HB 463, at 5 (2012), 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.kybar.org/resource/resmgr/2012_Convention_ 
Files/ac2012_2.pdf. 
 247. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky. 
Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017). 
 248. Id. 
 249. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2018) (“In making [the pretrial 
release and bail] determination, the court shall consider the pretrial risk as-
sessment . . . .”). 
 250. Id. § 431.066(3)–(4). 
 251. Id. § 431.066(5)(a). 
 252. Id. § 431.525(2). 
 253. Id. § 218A.135(1).  
  
344 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:303 
 
was made abundantly clear, stating, “Nothing in these guide-
lines shall be construed to limit the court’s discretion as to 
whether or not to grant pretrial release to a defendant.”254  
When the Kentucky Legislature passed HB 463, Kentucky 
used a risk assessment algorithm that was developed internally 
by their pretrial services agency.255 Like most pretrial risk as-
sessment tools in use,256 it was a checklist-style instrument that 
put heavy weight on criminal history and prior FTAs.257 It also 
included several non-criminal justice inputs, such as whether 
the defendant had stable employment, housing, and a reference 
willing to attend court or co-sign the bond.258 It was validated 
(i.e., shown to be predictive of pretrial rearrest and FTA) in a 
2010 study conducted by the JFA Institute.259 
In July of 2013, Kentucky adopted a new risk assessment 
tool: the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).260 This tool was devel-
oped by the Arnold Foundation using both Kentucky data and a 
large dataset on pretrial releases in more than 300 jurisdic-
tions.261 The PSA evaluates risk along three dimensions: risk of 
FTA, risk of new arrest, and risk of new arrest for a violent 
 
 254. ORDER APPROVING JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
MONITORED RELEASE § 11 (Ky. 2011), http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/ 
Rules_Procedures/201112.pdf. In addition to changes to the pretrial system, HB 
463 made a number of post-conviction changes. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, PUBLIC SAFETY AND OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 
(HB 463): JUSTICE REINVESTMENT SUMMARY 5–16 (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/nalfo/JusticeReinvestmentMikeMullins.pdf. Risk assessment tools 
were made mandatory in the pre-sentencing report, for determining supervision 
levels among defendants on probation or parole, and in determining parole suit-
ability. Id. at 6. Other changes included mandatory re-entry supervision, a 
speeding up of the parole process, and reduced penalties for drug possession and 
minor drug trafficking. Id. at 7–8, 12–13. 
 255. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky. 
Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017). 
 256. For a summary of common pretrial risk assessment tools and their in-
puts, see Mayson, supra note 65, at 507–18. 
 257. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST., KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RISK ASSESS-
MENT INSTRUMENT VALIDATION 13 tbl.11 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/ 
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=60b06cf 
8-f956-d6f1-d07f-a426f0465846. 
 258. Id. at 9 tbl.6. 
 259. Id. at 3. 
 260. Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD 
FOUND., at 5 (Nov. 2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf. 
 261. Id. at 3. 
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crime.262 The defendant’s overall risk score is a combination of 
the risk of new arrest and the risk of FTA;263 a flag for being at 
high risk of violent crime was added in 2014.264 The inputs for 
the PSA are similar to those used in Kentucky’s previous risk 
tool,265 although the weights are different and the non-criminal-
justice items were eliminated.266  
Kentucky was the first jurisdiction in which courts piloted 
the PSA;267 it is now in use in approximately forty jurisdictions 
throughout the United States, including the states of Arizona 
and New Jersey.268 Throughout 2013 and 2014, the Arnold Foun-
dation continued to do research on their tool and made several 
modifications.269 In July of 2014 Kentucky switched to a modi-
fied version of the PSA: one that is currently in use in jurisdic-
tions around the country.270 Age at arrest was added as an input 
to the new criminal activity score, and the weighting was ad-
justed slightly.271 
The risk assessment is conducted by the pretrial services of-
ficer right after the defendant is arrested and booked into jail.272 
Using information gathered from the interview as well as the 
defendant’s criminal records, the pretrial officer calculates the 
defendant’s risk score and presents it to the judge during the bail 
hearing.273 In Kentucky, the bail hearing is supposed to occur 
 
 262. Id. at 4. Lauryn Goulding provides compelling arguments for why it is 
important to predict flight risk and danger separately. Lauryn P. Goulding, Dis-
entangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837 (2016). 
 263. Based on internal documentation provided by the Kentucky Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts. 
 264. FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 3. 
 265. The inputs include: pending charge, prior misdemeanor conviction, 
prior felony conviction, prior FTAs, prior violent conviction, prior incarceration, 
violent current offense, violent current offense for someone under twenty-one. 
Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment, supra note 260, at 4. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. at 3. 
 268. Pretrial Justice, LAURA & JOHN FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation 
.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 269. Based on documentation provided by Kentucky Pretrial Services (on file 
with author). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Virtual Tour of Kentucky Pretrial Services, KY. CT. JUST., http://courts 
.ky.gov/courtprograms/pretrialservices/Pages/virtualtour.aspx (last visited Oct. 
14, 2018) (providing detailed information about pretrial procedure in Ken-
tucky). 
 273. Id. 
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within 24 hours of booking.274 In many Kentucky counties, this 
occurs via a phone call between the pretrial officer and the 
judge.275 The pretrial officer informs the judge of the details of 
the alleged offense as well as the risk level of the defendant.276 
The judge decides a bail amount, supervision status, and any 
other conditions of release.277 If the defendant does not post bail 
within twenty-four hours, the pretrial officer notifies the court 
at which point the judge can choose to change the bond.278 If the 
judge does not alter the bond, or if the defendant still does not 
post, the defendant usually must wait for the first appearance to 
have the bond reconsidered.279  
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
The data used in this study was provided by Kentucky’s Ad-
ministrative Office of the Courts and covers all defendants who 
were arrested and booked into jail between July 1, 2009 and July 
1, 2016. The data was extracted in May 2017 from records main-
tained by Kentucky Pretrial Services and Kentucky courts. The 
original data set contains more than 1.5 million criminal cases. 
The analysis presented in this Article includes only cases that 
originate with an arrest for a new criminal offense. Cases where 
the original arrest was for a probation or parole violation, an 
FTA, or a violation of conditions of pretrial release are omitted, 
leaving 1,030,732 criminal cases.280 
Table 1 presents a selection of statistics describing the sam-
ple used for analysis. The first column refers to misdemeanor 
cases (65% of the sample) and the middle column refers to felony 
cases. For reference, the rightmost column provides statistics 
 
 274. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky. 
Pretrial Services (May 15, 2017). 
 275. Virtual Tour of Kentucky Pretrial Services, supra note 272. 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id.  
 278. Id.  
 279. Id.  
 280. The data used in this study, originally collected from the Kentucky Pre-
trial Services and Kentucky courts, is on file with the author. While bail deci-
sions for violation and FTA cases are also interesting, there are good reasons 
why they may be different than bail decisions for an original arrest; including 
that both groups would complicate the interpretation of results. All of the main 
results, however, are still found when analyzing the full sample of cases. 
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from a national sample of felony defendants in large urban coun-
ties.281 While this is the most expansive data set publicly avail-
able to describe court processes nationally, it is not the most ob-
vious comparison group since it is largely urban and Kentucky 
is largely rural.282 Nonetheless, some differences and similarities 
are worth noting. First, Kentucky defendants are more likely to 
be white than those in large urban counties. Although the frac-
tion of felony defendants facing violent charges is much lower in 
Kentucky, the fraction who remain detained until their case is 
disposed is similar to the national average in large urban coun-
ties. The fraction of felony defendants who are released within a 
day is slightly lower in Kentucky and the fraction that is granted 
non-financial release is considerably lower: less than half of the 
non-financial release rate in urban counties. Misdemeanants 
have a slightly higher release rate than felony defendants, but 
still almost a quarter are detained until disposition and a third 
spend more than one day in jail.  
Bail amounts for defendants who are required to pay bond 
are lower in Kentucky as well, possibly because there are no bail 
bondsmen to loan money for bond. The fraction of released de-
fendants with an FTA or pretrial rearrest are both lower in Ken-
tucky than the national urban average. 
 










Male 70% 73% 83% 
Age 34 33 32 
Black 16% 19% 45% 
White 80% 77% 30% 
Hispanic 3.6% 1.7% 24% 
Has Violent 
Felony Charge 
NA 10% 25% 
 
 281. REAVES, supra note 31. 
 282. E.g., Urban Percentage of the Population for States, Historical, IOWA ST. 
U.: IOWA COMMUNITY INDICATORS PROGRAM, https://www.icip.iastate.edu/ 
tables/population/urban-pct-states (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (reporting that in 
the results of the 2010 census, the urban percentage of the population in Ken-
tucky was 58.4% while the same figure for the United States as a whole was 
80.7%). 
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Prior Felony  
Conviction 
33% 46% 43% 
Release Prior to 
Disposition 
77% 62% 62% 
Release Within a 
Day 
66% 29% 31% 
Non-Financial 
Release 
37% 16% 40% 
Median Bail for 
Those Not Given 
Non-Financial 
Release 
$1000 $5000 $10000 
Median Bail for 
Detainees 
$1000 $10000 $25000 
Fraction of  
Releasees with at 
Least One FTA 
14% 10% 17% 




10% 13% 16% 
Fraction of  
Defendants with 
at Least One FTA 
10% 6% NA 




8% 8% NA 
 
As in other jurisdictions, a large fraction of Kentucky de-
fendants who are required to pay cash bond to secure their re-
lease fail to post within three days of the bail hearing. Figure 1 
shows the fraction of defendants with a given amount of bail who 
are released within three days. Around 20% of defendants with 
bail set at $500, and half of those with bail set at $2000, remain 
in jail for more than three days beyond their booking date.283 
 
 283. The provision in HB 463 that granted $100 per day in bail credit was 
routinely ignored. According to the author’s own calculations, about a third of 
all judges never allowed this for any defendants. Only about 3% of defendants 
with cash bail set in 2015 received bail credit. By Kentucky statute, judges are 
allowed to refuse bail credit to defendants based on flight risk or danger. KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(5)(b)(2) (West 2018). 
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C. HB 463 LED TO AN INCREASED USE OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
(AND AN OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL METHODS) 
This Section has two goals. First, it seeks to demonstrate 
that Kentucky’s 2011 law mandating risk assessment resulted 
in its increased use. Second, it explains the empirical methodol-
ogy used throughout the remainder of Part III. These two goals 
are combined because it can be useful to discuss methods with 
the aid of an example, as opposed to discussing them abstractly.  
The empirical methods used in this paper consist mostly of 
graphical time-trend analysis: a visual representation of trends 
and changes to pretrial outcomes. The focus of the analysis is on 
sharp changes that occurred right around HB 463’s enactment 
and Kentucky’s adoption of the PSA. A sharp, discrete change to 
pretrial practices or outcomes whose timing coincides exactly 
with the implementation of a new law or a new risk tool can 
likely be attributed to that law or tool. The causes of longer term 
trends are harder to identify, and thus are not a primary focus 
of this article. While formal tests are not reported, all of the 



















Note: Each bar indicates the fraction of defendants who are re-
leased within three days among those who had monetary bail set 
at the amount shown. 
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changes that this Article describes as occurring before/after HB 
463 and before/after the PSA are statistically significant. With 
more than a million criminal cases, any change that is visible in 
a graphical time-trend analysis will also be highly statistically 
significant. 
Demonstrating that judges increased their use of the risk 
assessment instrument when HB 463 made it mandatory re-
quires showing that bail practices changed in accordance with 
the action-directives associated with each risk classification. In 
other words, it requires showing that judges became more leni-
ent with defendants classified as low risk and stricter with de-
fendants classified as high risk.  
Figure 2 shows a time trend in the fraction of defendants in 
each of the three risk groups who are granted non-financial re-
lease at the first bail hearing.284 The horizontal axis indicates 
the booking date and the vertical axis is the fraction of defend-
ants granted a non-financial release at the first bail hearing. The 
dashed vertical line indicates the date that HB 463 was intro-
duced as legislation and the solid vertical line indicates the date 
it was implemented. The horizontal lines are estimates of the 
time trend in non-financial release for defendants in each of the 
three risk classification groups. The time trends are estimated 
using local linear smoothing with a bandwidth of 120 days.285 
The local linear smoothing is employed because on any given day 
the actual number of defendants who are granted non-financial 
release can be higher or lower than expected due to idiosyncratic 
factors. This idiosyncratic fluctuation, often referred to as noise, 
 
 284. The unit of analysis in this, and in the remainder of this Article, is a 
case. For conciseness, however, the time trends are described as referring to 
defendants, not cases. Using more precise language, Figure 2 shows a time 
trend in the fraction of cases in which defendants received non-financial release. 
 285. Details about this technique can be found in many places. See, e.g., 
STATA SOFTWARE, lpoly — Kernel-weighted Local Polynomial Smoothing, at 4–
8, http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rlpoly.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (the 
Stata manual for the command “lpoly”). 
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is visually distracting, and so time trend graphs will almost al-
ways use some method of smoothing to make the trend easier to 
see.  
Each point on the dotted line represents the fraction of low-
risk defendants who are expected to get a non-financial release 
on a particular date, and so forth for the other risk groups. The 
shading around each line represents the 95% confidence inter-
val—a measure of uncertainty—for the time trend. There are 
cuts in the smoothing of the time trend at times when one might 
expect sharp changes to the trend: in Figure 2 there is a cut at 
the date when legislation was introduced and another at the date 
it was implemented. The cuts function by limiting the data that 
is used to build the trend line to only one side of the cut point. In 
other words, the trend line for defendants who were booked right 
Figure 2 - How HB 463 Affected Non-financial Release 
Rates for Defendants at Different Risk Levels 
 
 
Note: The top, middle, and bottom line indicate the fraction of 
low, moderate, and high-risk defendants who are granted non-
financial release. The dashed vertical line is the date that HB 
463 was introduced as legislation; the solid line indicates the 
date it was implemented. 
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before a cut date will be estimated using only data from defend-
ants booked before the cut date, and the same for defendants 
booked right after a cut date.286  
Figure 2 shows a dramatic increase in the fraction of low-
risk defendants who were granted non-financial release around 
the time of HB 463. Before the bill was introduced only about 
35% of low risk defendants were granted non-financial release, 
but after its implementation that number rose to 57%: a 22 per-
centage point increase, or a 63% increase relative to the earlier 
mean. The dashed line shows a 16 percentage point increase in 
non-financial releases for moderate-risk defendants and the 
solid line shows that the fraction of high-risk defendants receiv-
ing non-financial release remained essentially the same. This 
figure shows that HB 463 resulted in a marked change in prac-
tices, which corresponded closely with the classifications of the 
risk assessment. 
Overall, HB 463 led to a sizeable decrease in bail for defend-
ants who were ranked as low risk, a more moderate decrease in 
bail for defendants ranked as moderate risk, and an increase in 
bail for defendants ranked high risk, as shown in  
Release rates changed accordingly. Figure 3 shows the 
changes in the fraction of defendants who are released within 
three days of the bail hearing before and after HB 463.287 HB 463 
led to a 9 percentage point increase in releases for low-risk de-
fendants, a 7 percentage point increase in releases for moderate-
risk defendants, and a 4 percentage point decrease in releases 
for high-risk defendants. Interestingly, there was no change in 
the release rate for defendants who did not receive a risk score 
due to difficulties in verifying key inputs. This further supports 
the claim that the change in bail setting practices after HB 463 
is due to the information provided by the risk assessment.  
 
 
 286. The Appendix provides an alternative method of graphing time 
trends—binned scatter plots—which demonstrates each of the key empirical 
claims made in this Article without the use of smoothing or cuts. 
 287. Defendants who were detained until the case was disposed, but for 
whom disposition occurred within three days of the bail hearing, are counted as 
released within three days.  
  




Figure 3 - The Impact that HB 463 Had on the Release Rate 
of Defendants with Various Risk Classifications 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the change in release rates between the two 
months before HB 463 was introduced and the two months after it 
was implemented. The change in release rates is shown for defend-
ants who were rated low, moderate, or high risk, as well as for de-
fendants who did not receive a risk score. A positive change means 
that defendants were more likely to be released after HB 463 than 
they were before. 
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Low risk  35% 57% +22 
Moderate 
risk 
15% 31% +16 




Low risk 23% 14% -9 
Moderate 
risk 
29% 22% -7 





Low risk 24% 18% -6 
Moderate 
risk 
35% 31% -4 





Low risk 73% 81% +9 
Moderate 
risk 
50% 57% +7 
High risk 34% 30% -4 
 
D. RISK ASSESSMENT’S IMPACT ON BOND SETTING AND RELEASE 
While the previous section focused on differing impacts for 
defendants with different risk classifications, this section shows 
the overall effect on all defendants. Specifically, this section an-
alyzes the impact that HB 463 and the adoption of the PSA had 
on bond setting and release.  
Figure 4 shows a time trend in the fraction of all defendants 
granted non-financial release at the first bail hearing. From left 
to right, the vertical lines indicate the date when HB 463 was 
introduced and implemented, and the date that the PSA was 
adopted and revised to the version that is now broadly used 
around the country. 
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Figure 4 shows a sharp jump up in the fraction of defendants 
who are granted non-financial release coinciding exactly with 
HB 463. The increase begins as soon as the bill was introduced 
(it passed almost unanimously)288 and accelerates at the time of 
implementation. In total, there is a 13 percentage point jump in 
non-financial releases from January to June of 2011. Almost im-
mediately, however, the rate of non-financial releases begins to 
fall. It declined steadily until July 2013, when the PSA was 
adopted. There is a smaller spike upwards after the adoption of 
the PSA; then the non-financial release rate declines again after 
that, with virtually no change as the PSA is revised. By January 
of 2016, more than half of the increase in non-financial releases 
resulting from HB 463 had disappeared. 
 
 288. See HEYERLY, supra note 216, at 4. 
Figure 4 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likeli-
hood of Non-financial Release 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are 
granted non-financial release over time. From left to right, the 
vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legisla-
tion, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was 
adopted, and the date it was modified.  
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Figure 5 shows the fraction of defendants given a low cash 
bond (requiring a cash payment of $1000 or less) at the first bail 
hearing. Interestingly, we see almost the exact inverse of the 
pattern in Figure 4. HB 463 results in a sharp drop in the frac-
tion of defendants receiving low cash bail, an increase over time 
as practices move back toward their previous state, a small jump 
down in low cash bail around the adoption of the PSA, and an 
increase after that. This suggests that judges responded to the 
risk assessment changes analyzed in this Article by substituting 
non-financial release for low-cash bail. As time went on, how-
ever, they returned to their previous bail setting practices. 
 
Figure 6 shows a time trend in the fraction of defendants 
who are released within three days of booking.289 For visual sim-
plicity, and because there are very little changes that occur 
 
 289. About 5% of defendants have a holder, which decreases the release rate 
somewhat. 
Figure 5 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Use of 
Low Cash Bail 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are given 
bail of $1000 or less. From left to right, the vertical lines indicate 
the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was 
implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date 
it was modified.  
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around that time, there is no cut in the time trend estimation at 
the time the PSA is revised. As can be seen in Figure 6, neither 
HB 463 nor the PSA has a big effect on the release rate. HB 463 
led to only a 4 percentage point increase in the fraction of de-
fendants released within three days of booking, and the adoption 
of the PSA led to a barely perceptible 1 percentage point increase 
in releases. It appears that most of the defendants granted a 
non-financial release as a result of these changes would have 
gotten out on a low cash bond regardless. Moreover, the small 
increase in releases was short-lived: by 2015, the release rate 
was lower than it had been before HB 463. 
 
E. RISK ASSESSMENT’S IMPACTS ON PRETRIAL MISCONDUCT 
The small increase in releases as a result of HB 463 was ac-
companied by an increase in the likelihood that defendants 
would fail to appear in court. Figure 7 shows a sharp jump up in 
the FTA rate (defined as the fraction of all defendants who fail 
Figure 6 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likeli-
hood of Being Released Within Three Days of Booking 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are re-
leased within three days of booking. From left to right, the verti-
cal lines indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, 
the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was 
adopted, and the date it was modified.  
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to appear for at least one court date) from before the legislation 
was introduced to after the new law was implemented. The size 
of the increase—about 3 percentage point—was not large in and 
of itself, but it is large relative to the base level: about a 40% 
increase over the mean. The introduction of the PSA did not lead 
to a decline in FTAs. If anything, the FTA rate is slightly higher 
after the PSA was adopted than before. This does not necessarily 
reflect on the PSA, however, as there is no sharp change in FTAs 
that coincides with the date that the PSA was adopted. The drift 
upward in FTAs during that time period could have been caused 
by some other factor.  
 
Figure 8 shows a time trend in the fraction of all defendants 
who were arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period.290 
The graph shows an increase in rearrests around the time of HB 
463. The increase is less of a stark and indisputable break in 
 
 290. The pretrial rearrest rate captures only arrests that are for new crimes, 
not arrests for violation of court orders or FTAs. 
Figure 7 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likeli-
hood a Defendant Would have at Least One FTA 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who fail to ap-
pear in court at least once. From left to right, the vertical lines 
indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date 
it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and 
the date it was modified.  
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trend than was seen for FTAs in Figure 7. Inferring that HB 463 
led to an increase in rearrests requires inferring that the drop in 
rearrests right before the introduction of the legislation was in-
dicative of a meaningful change in trend that would have contin-
ued in the absence of the law. One could also argue that the drop 
down in rearrests toward the end of 2010 was just an idiosyn-
cratic fluctuation in the rearrest rate, and the rise after the leg-
islation was introduced was simply more idiosyncratic fluctua-
tion. Alternative analysis, shown in the Appendix, suggests that 
the former interpretation is more likely.291 Regardless, it is clear 
that the increased use of risk assessments as a result of HB 463 
did not result in a decline in the pretrial rearrest rate.  
There is no sharp change in the pretrial rearrest rate around 
either the adoption or modification of the PSA. The pretrial re-
arrest rate is slightly higher after the adoption of the PSA, but 
this appears to be part of a general upward drift in the pretrial 
rearrest rate and thus not likely to be due to the change in risk 
assessment tools.292 
 
 291. A post-HB 463 pretrial rearrest increase can also be seen using an al-
ternative measure of rearrest, and in a sub-sample of non-drug felony defend-
ants. 
 292. The Arnold Foundation report that claimed that the PSA led to lower 
rates of pretrial rearrest, FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, used a slightly 
different sample (all cases, not just cases that began with an arrest for a new 
offense) and a different measure (the fraction of released defendants with a pre-
trial arrest, not the fraction of all defendants with a pretrial rearrest). This is 
not the cause of the disparity between their results and those shown in this 
Article. Using their methods, this author was able to replicate their findings 
and show that the post-PSA pretrial rearrest rate rose from 8.5% at the time 
that their report was published to 11% once all cases had resolved. See supra 
note 218 and accompanying text (providing more discussion about the differ-
ences in results). 
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Figure 9 shows another important pretrial outcome: the 
fraction of defendants who are rearrested for a violent felony pre-
trial. There are no visually discernible changes in the violent fel-
ony rearrest rate occurring as a result of either HB 463 or the 
adoption of the PSA. Furthermore, this rate is very low. Less 
than one percent of all defendants are rearrested for a violent 
felony (murder, non-negligible manslaughter, forcible rape, rob-





Figure 8 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likeli-




Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are 
arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period. From 
left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was 
introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as 
law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date it was mod-
ified.  
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The changes that were shown graphically in this Section are 
summarized in Table 3. The left-most numerical column shows 
outcomes for all defendants booked during the two months be-
fore HB 463 legislation was introduced: December 2010 and Jan-
uary 2011. The next column shows outcomes for all defendants 
booked in the two months after HB 463 was implemented: July 
and August of 2011. The final two columns show the two-month 
averages before and after the adoption of the PSA: May and June 







Figure 9 – How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted the Likelihood 




Note: This figure shows the fraction of defendants who are arrested 
for a violent felony during the pretrial period. From left to right, the 
vertical lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was introduced 
as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA 
was adopted, and the date it was modified.  
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63% 67% 64% 65% 
FTA 7.6% 9.6% 9% 9.4% 
Pretrial 
Rearrest 




0.52% 0.59% 0.56% 0.52% 
 
The Appendix provides several figures to demonstrate that 
the results presented in Parts II.D and II.E are robust to alter-
native specifications. In particular, the Appendix shows that the 
key results are not caused by changes in the types of defendants 
who are arrested, are robust to alternative methods of measur-
ing pretrial rearrest and FTA, do not depend on specific choices 
regarding smoothing and cut points, and are prevalent among a 
group of defendants who are least likely to be affected by other 
non-risk-assessment related aspects of HB 463. 
F. RACIAL AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN BOND AND RELEASE 
This Section evaluates whether risk assessment affected ra-
cial disparities in the likelihood that a defendant is granted non-
financial release or is otherwise released within three days of 
booking. Figure 10 shows time trends in the fraction of white 
defendants who are granted non-financial release (the dashed 
line) and the fraction of black defendants who are granted non-
financial release (the solid line). Relative to black defendants, 
white defendants are more likely to be granted non-financial re-
lease throughout the entire time period of the sample (This could 
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be due to racial bias, but it could also be due to differences in the 
charged offense, criminal history, etc.). There was an increase in 
non-financial release for both groups as a result of HB 463, how-
ever the increase was larger for white defendants than it was for 
blacks. The racial gap jumped from about 2 percentage point to 
10 percentage point after HB 463 was implemented and re-
mained relatively constant through January of 2016. 
 
Figure 11 shows time trends for both races in the likelihood 
of being released within three days of booking. We see a similar 
but more attenuated pattern; the race gap increased after HB 
463 and then remained relatively constant at about 5 percentage 
points. In fact, despite the increase in the likelihood of being 
granted non-financial release, HB 463 did not lead to a visually 
discernible increase in the likelihood of being released within 3 
days for black defendants. 
Figure 10 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Racial 
Disparities in Non-financial Release 
 
 
Note: The dashed horizontal line shows the fraction of white 
defendants who are granted non-financial release and the solid 
line shows the fraction of black defendants who are granted 
non-financial release. From left to right, the vertical lines indi-
cate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it 
was implemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and 
the date it was modified.  
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Figure 12 shows that there are regional disparities in the 
likelihood of being detained pretrial. The dashed line shows a 
time trend in the fraction of rural defendants who are released 
within three days of booking and the solid line shows the same 
for non-rural defendants. Before HB 463, rural defendants were 
about 8 percentage point more likely to be detained pretrial than 
those living in cities or suburban areas.293 However, this gap 
shrunk and then reversed itself over time. The gap shrunk partly 
because rural regions responded more to HB 463 than non-rural 
regions. It also shrunk because the release rate dropped precip-
itously for non-rural regions over the six years of analysis: from 
a high of about 70% in January 2010 to a low of 55% in January 
2016. 
 
 293. There are a variety of potential explanations for this gap: differences in 
access to bail money, judicial attitudes, the charged offense, criminal history, 
difficulties with monitoring pretrial releases, etc. 
Figure 11 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Racial Dispar-
ities in Pretrial Release 
 
 
Note: The dashed horizontal line shows the fraction of white defend-
ants who are released within three days and the solid line shows the 
fraction of black defendants who are released within three days. From 
left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date HB 463 was intro-
duced as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the 
PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified.  
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The differing trends in rural and non-rural regions compli-
cate the analysis of racial disparities, since rural regions have a 
high percentage of white defendants (85%) while non-rural re-
gions are more mixed (around 68% white and 30% black). Thus, 
the fact that white defendants appear to have been advantaged 
by HB 463 more than black defendants could simply be because 
they live in regions where the judges changed their bond setting 
habits more as a result of the law.  
The upper graph of Figure 13 shows racial disparities over 
time once county effects and regional time trends have been ac-
counted for. This was accomplished by estimating the average 
release rate for all races in each county by month by year.294 Fig-
 
 294. Formally, this is constructed by regressing a dummy for being released 
pretrial on county fixed effects as well as circuit-by-month-by-year fixed effects 
and then collecting the residuals from that regression. The left graph in Figure 
Figure 12 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Rural/Ur-
ban Disparities in Pretrial Release 
 
 
Note: The dashed horizontal line shows the fraction of rural de-
fendants who are released within three days and the solid line 
shows the fraction of non-rural defendants who are released within 
three days. From left to right, the vertical lines indicate the date 
HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented 
as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified.  
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ure 13 plots the difference between the actual and predicted re-
lease rate for white and black defendants. The fact that the hor-
izontal time trend for white defendants hovers at around 1 per-
centage point indicates that white defendants are about 1 
percentage point more likely to be released than the county av-
erage. Similarly, black defendants are 3–4 percentage point less 
likely to be released than the county average. As can be seen, 
once county effects and varying time trends at the circuit level 
have been accounted for, the racial gap in the likelihood of being 
released is pretty constant over time at about 5 percentage point 
While this research design is not well suited for detecting small 
changes, there is no visible evidence to suggest that risk assess-
ment affected racial disparities once differing regional trends 
were accounted for.  
 
13 is a local linear time trend of those residuals for black and white defendants. 
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Figure 13 - How HB 463 and the PSA Impacted Racial 
Disparities in Pretrial Release After Accounting for 
County Effects (upper) and County + Charge + Recent 
Criminal History Effects (lower) 
 
 
Note: In each figure, the dashed line shows a time trend in 
releases for white defendants and the solid line shows a time 
trend in releases for black defendants. The upper figure shows 
the difference in release rates once county effects and time 
trends have been accounted for. The lower figure shows the 
difference in release rates once county effects, time trends, of-
fense, age, gender, and recent criminal history have been ac-
counted for. From left to right, the vertical lines in each chart 
indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the 
date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA was 
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The lower graph in Figure 13 shows that about half of the 
racial gap in release rates disappears once gender, age, detailed 
information about the charge, and recent criminal history is ac-
counted for.295 This graph shows the difference between the ac-
tual release rates and the predicted release rates, using predic-
tions which take into account not only county by month by year 
effects, but also age, gender, the top charge, the total number of 
charges, the level of the charges, and whether or not the defend-
ant has a pending case, prior case, or FTA within the year before 
the booking date.296 Even after accounting for these variables, 
black defendants are still about 2–3 percentage point more likely 
to be detained than white defendants. There are a number of po-
tential explanations for this gap. For one, the data does not in-
clude the full criminal history. It’s possible that black defendants 
have more prior arrests/FTAs and thus had higher bail. Racial 
bias could also lead the judge to set higher bail, although this is 
less likely in Kentucky since judges are often unaware of the race 
of the defendant when setting bail. Third, due to correlations be-
tween race and income, black defendants may be less able to af-
ford a given amount of bail than white defendants. 
In sum, Part III provided evidence that judges did use the 
risk assessment more when it was made mandatory in HB 463. 
HB 463 resulted in a 22 percentage point increase in the likeli-
hood of non-financial release for low risk defendants and a 16 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of non-financial re-
lease for moderate risk defendants. However, some of those who 
were released on non-financial bond as a result of HB 463 would 
have otherwise been released on low cash bond. Thus, the net 
effects on the release rate were attenuated. HB 463 led to a 9 
percentage point increase in total releases (both non-financial 
and on money bond) for low-risk defendants, a 7 percentage point 
increase in releases for moderate-risk defendants, and a 4 per-
centage point decrease in releases for high-risk defendants. In 
total, this resulted in a 4 percentage point increase in the release 
 
 295. The graph on the right of Figure 13 shows residuals from a regression 
of a release dummy on county fixed effects, circuit-by-month-by-year fixed ef-
fects, the exact charge for the forty-two most common top charges, the total 
number of charges, whether the defendant had at least one class A, B, C or D 
felony, whether the defendant had at least one class A or B misdemeanor, the 
age at arrest, gender, and whether the defendant had a prior arrest, a prior 
FTA, or a pending charge within the year before booking. 
 296. The criminal history is limited to a year before the booking date since 
the data begins in July of 2009. Thus, estimating more than a year of criminal 
history data would not be possible for defendants who are booked toward the 
beginning of the data set.  
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rate for all defendants, which eroded over time as judges re-
turned to their previous bail setting habits. FTAs increased by 3 
percentage point after HB 463 was implemented, and pretrial 
rearrest increased by about 1 percentage point The adoption of 
the PSA had negligible effects on the overall release rate, FTA 
rate, or pretrial rearrest rate. Neither HB 463 nor the PSA had 
any effect on racial disparities once regional differences were ac-
counted for. 
IV.  LEARNING FROM KENTUCKY’S EXPERIENCE WITH 
RISK ASSESSMENT   
This Section discusses various implications of the empirical 
results presented in Part III. It begins by exploring potential rea-
sons why the large gains that many had assumed would accom-
pany the adoption of the risk assessment tool were not realized 
in Kentucky. It discusses ways that Kentucky’s experience with 
pretrial risk assessment should and should not affect expecta-
tions about the impacts of risk assessment in other jurisdictions. 
Finally, it calls for a new direction in the evidence-based crimi-
nal justice movement: a deeper integration of evaluation into the 
process of adopting new methods. 
A. WHY NO EFFICIENCY GAINS? 
After HB 463, judges incorporated risk assessment into 
their bail practices significantly more than they had previously. 
If the risk classifications of the risk assessment instrument were 
much more accurate than the judge’s intuitive assessment of 
risk, one might expect a gain in efficiency. This could be seen as 
a simultaneous decrease in detention rates, FTAs, and pretrial 
crime—or at least decreasing one without increasing the others. 
This did not occur. Why not?  
First, risk assessment tools may not have provided as large 
a gain in predictive power as expected. As discussed in Part II.A 
of this Article, the research arguing that actuarial tools out per-
form human intuition in predicting crime is far from definitive. 
While there are reasons to believe that risk assessment tools pro-
vide new and useful information, the margin of gain is unclear.  
Another possibility is that judicial discretion was used not 
to correct the risk assessment when it erred, but to override the 
risk assessment when it was correct. Human decision-making 
has been shown to be subject to a variety of foibles: false heuris-
tics, over-weighting of small probabilities, over-confidence, risk 
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aversion, etc.297 While these types of human error are part of the 
reason to expect that actuarial prediction tools can out-predict 
human intuition, they may also be reasons why actuarial predic-
tion tools are not that useful in practice. The policy-relevant 
question is not “Is the actuarial tool better at predicting miscon-
duct than the judge” but rather “Does the judge make better de-
cisions when given access to actuarial predictions?” A recent sur-
vey indicates that only a small minority of judges think that a 
risk assessment tool does a better job at predicting future crime 
than themselves.298 Given this skepticism, it is unclear under 
what circumstances judges make different decisions as a result 
of the tool than they would have otherwise. If the prediction tool 
fails to influence decisions in circumstances where the predictive 
gains are the greatest, the usefulness of the tool will be curtailed.  
It is also possible that the use of actuarial risk tools did lead 
to a substantial increase in the predictive capacity of judges, but 
that this information did not translate into improved outcomes. 
One of the most dramatic changes in bail setting practice as a 
result of HB 463 is an increase in non-financial release as op-
posed to release on low-cash bond. While this likely resulted in a 
decrease in the number of defendants detained pretrial due to an 
inability to pay bail, it may have reduced the incentives for re-
leased defendants to show up in court. Alternative methods of 
increasing appearance rates, such as court notifications, were 
rare: less than 5% of released defendants were assigned by the 
court to receive phone call reminders of their next appearance 
(Kentucky has since dramatically expanded their use of court re-
minders).299 If the action-directives associated with being classi-
fied as low risk included robust support to help defendants over-
come barriers to appearance (difficulties with transportation, 
getting time off work, arranging child care, etc.), the use of the 
tool may have been more effective. 
Generally speaking, risk assessments will only lead to lower 
rates of misconduct if the action-directives associated with them 
 
 297. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgement Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Bias, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (generally discussing a number 
of different cognitive heuristics and biases that affect the ability to assess prob-
abilities). 
 298. See Chanenson & Hyatt, supra note 120, at 10. 
 299. Jennifer Elek et al., Use of Court Date Reminder Notices to Improve 
Court Appearance Rates, PRETRIAL JUST. CTR. FOR CTS., at 1 (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/Microsites/PJCC/Home/Topics/Pretrial-Services.aspx; 
(follow “Use of Court Date Reminder Notices to Improve Court Appearance 
Rates” hyperlink).  
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are effective at mitigating risk. Identifying the appropriate in-
terventions for different risk levels is non-trivial. For instance, 
will placing high-risk defendants in pretrial detention decrease 
crime, or will the destabilizing effects of incarceration actually 
lead to more crime?300 Or, to take the example discussed in Part 
II.C, does assignment to a higher security prison decrease the 
likelihood of within-prison misconduct? Richard Berk and coau-
thors showed that using actuarial risk assessment to assign pris-
oners to different security classifications did not lead to lower 
rates of offending while in prison.301 It did, however, appear to 
be effective at sorting prisoners based on offending level: while 
the total offending rates were the same, the rates were higher in 
high security prisons and lower in low security prisons.302 If the 
use of risk assessment did not lead to lower total offenses, it may 
simply have been because placement in high security prisons 
was not effective at preventing offending. 
B. LESSONS FOR OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Jurisdictions around the country differ widely in their crim-
inal procedure, culture, and demographics. The experience other 
jurisdictions have with risk assessment will not, in general, be 
an exact mirror of Kentucky’s. Nonetheless, certain lessons can 
be drawn from Kentucky’s experience that should influence what 
to expect from pretrial risk assessment in other areas. 
First, Kentucky’s experience with risk assessment should 
temper hopes that the adoption of risk assessment will lead to a 
dramatic decrease in incarceration with no concomitant costs in 
terms of crime or failures to appear. That is not to say that risk 
assessment brought no benefit. Just because Kentucky was not 
able to simultaneously improve along all three margins (deten-
tion, crime, and FTAs) doesn’t mean that the tool wasn’t useful. 
It simply means that realizing large gains in practice are not as 
easy as realizing them in a hypothetical policy simulation. While 
it is certainly possible that other jurisdictions will experience a 
larger efficiency gain than Kentucky, there is no strong a priori 
reason to expect this to be the case. The risk tools used in Ken-
tucky are similar or identical to other pretrial risk assessment 
 
 300. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream 
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715 
(2017). 
 301. See Berk et al., supra note 208, at 232. 
 302. Id. at 235. 
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tools currently in use.303 They were shown to be predictive of fu-
ture offending and non-appearance.304 The action-directives as-
sociated with the tool—non-financial release for low-risk defend-
ants, release onto supervision for moderate-risk defendants, and 
supervision or detention for high-risk defendants—are fairly 
typical of the action-directives used in other jurisdictions.305 
Kentucky’s practice of allowing judges the discretion to deviate 
from these action-directives if they find a crime or flight risk is 
also typical of pretrial policy.306 
Kentucky does differ, however, in that it was an early 
adopter of risk instruments. This meant that the margins of 
change analyzed in HB 463 were not the difference between hav-
ing and not having a risk instrument, but the difference between 
having a risk instrument that was not heavily used and being 
required to consider it as part of the release decision. Further-
more, the fact that Kentucky was an early adopter means that 
the change being analyzed happened before risk assessment 
tools had gained the popularity that they currently have. This 
cultural shift may affect judges’ openness to these tools. For both 
of these reasons, the margin of change before and after HB 463 
is lower than it might be in other jurisdictions.  
While the Kentucky experience should temper hopes that 
pretrial risk assessment will result in a dramatic decline in de-
tention rates with no increase in FTAs or pretrial crime, it does 
not mean those hopes should be abandoned. As discussed in the 
previous Section, the usefulness of risk assessment in practice 
depends on a number of factors that are, as of yet, poorly under-
stood. Future studies may show that risk assessment has been 
more successful in other contexts and may provide insight on 
how to replicate and expand that success. 
 As for racial disparities, it is unclear whether the Kentucky 
experience with risk assessment will be replicated in other juris-
dictions. Kentucky is a largely rural,307 predominantly white 
state.308 Racial dynamics in Kentucky are not expected to be rep-
 
 303. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 304. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 257; FIRST SIX MONTHS, supra note 175, at 
3–4. 
 305. See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 86, at 22–23. 
 306. Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 37, at 
4. 
 307. Urban Percentage of the Population for States, supra note 282. 
 308. E.g., QuickFacts: Kentucky, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census 
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resentative of racial dynamics in dense urban areas, in the heav-
ily Latino southwest, or in the black rural south. That does not, 
however, mean that Kentucky’s experience provides no useful 
knowledge. In some regards, Kentucky provides a particularly 
stringent test of racial bias in risk assessment. Bail hearings in 
Kentucky usually happen over the phone between the judge and 
the pretrial officer.309 Thus, the judge is less likely to be aware 
of the race of the defendant, which should minimize the inci-
dence of explicit racial bias. Demonstrating that risk assessment 
does not increase racial disparities relative to the status quo 
when the status quo is not likely to be heavily biased is a 
stronger finding than showing that it does not increase racial 
disparities relative to potentially racist judges. Thus, Kentucky’s 
experience with risk assessment should somewhat assuage con-
cerns about expanded racial disparities, but further research is 
needed.  
Jurisdictions adopt risk assessment for a variety of reasons. 
In addition to hopes of increased efficiency, jurisdictions may 
look to risk assessment as a way to centralize and standardize 
pretrial decision-making. This is likely to be particularly appeal-
ing to bail reform advocates who seek to lower pretrial detention 
rates. In fact, lowering the jail population was one of the goals of 
HB 463.310 Kentucky demonstrates some of the challenges with 
this technocratic approach to bail reform. While judges certainly 
changed behaviors as a result of HB 463, they deviated from the 
action-directives associated with the risk assessment more often 
than not. Kentucky statute contains a presumptive default of 
non-monetary release for 90% of defendants, yet judges only 
granted non-financial release in less than a third of these 
cases—a clear violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
law.311 If the hope is to use risk assessment to coax pretrial prac-
tices in a certain direction, careful thought should be given to 
how to achieve this goal. Likely this involves either establishing 
clear guidelines for when deviation is or is not allowed, making 
deviation costly for the judge in some way (e.g. requiring a de-
tailed written explanation of the reasons for deviation), or nur-
 
.gov/quickfacts/ky (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (reporting that 87.8% of Ken-
tucky’s population is white). 
 309. Virtual Tour of Kentucky Pretrial Services, supra note 272.  
 310. See Jensen & Tilley, supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra Table 3. 
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turing a culture change among judges. These strategies may dif-
fer in jurisdictions where judges are elected, like Kentucky,312 
and in jurisdictions where judges are appointed, like New Jer-
sey.313  
The limits of enacting criminal justice reform via statute 
alone are not limited to risk assessment. In Kentucky, the tenu-
ous connection between statute and practice permeates the pre-
trial process. For example, Kentucky has a statute stating that 
defendants can earn a $100 credit toward the payment of bail for 
each day detained pretrial.314 Yet a vaguely worded loophole (ex-
cept if “found by the court to present a flight risk or to be a dan-
ger to others”) can result in blanket override of the statute if a 
judge so chooses.315 In fact, one third of the judges never allow 
jail time credit for any defendant.316 Even clearly written law 
from the Kentucky Constitution is routinely ignored. The consti-
tution states that defendants have a right to bail except in capi-
tal cases.317 Yet of the 24,000 defendants who were denied bond 
during the time period of the analysis, 90% of them were charged 
with only a misdemeanor or level D felony. Anecdotally, these 
were mostly defendants who demonstrated a persistent pattern 
of failing to appear in court,318 but a reasonable explanation does 
not negate the violation of constitutional rights. 
C. TOWARD A NEW DIRECTION IN EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
Data, science, and technology have been rapidly changing 
all aspects of modern life, from how we work, to how we learn, to 
 
 312. Judicial elections occurred in Kentucky in November 2010, KY. STATE 
BD. ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL 2010 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (Nov. 2, 2010), 
https://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election%20Results/2010-2019/ 
2010/off2010gen.pdf, and November 2014, KY. STATE BD. ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL 
2014 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (Nov. 4, 2014), https://elect.ky.gov/results/ 
2010-2019/Pages/2014PrimaryandGeneralElectionResults.aspx (follow “Offi-
cial Election Results” hyperlink). 
 313. Judicial Selection in the States: New Jersey, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NJ (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 314. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(5)(a) (West 2018). 
 315. Id. § 431.066(5)(b)(2). 
 316. Based on author’s own calculations. 
 317. KY. CONST. § 16 (“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, 
unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption 
great. . . .”). 
 318. Telephone Interview with Tara Boh Blair, Chief Operations Officer, Ky. 
Pretrial Services (May 15, 2017).  
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how we spend time with our friends and family. Tech-industry 
enthusiasts describe this process as “creative disruption”: a dra-
matic change in how people accomplish certain tasks with the 
advent of a new, more effective method.319 Many people would 
agree that the criminal justice system is itself in need of some 
creative disruption. Billions of dollars are spent each year on po-
licing, prosecuting, incarcerating, and monitoring our communi-
ties, yet few are satisfied with the results. Crime rates remain 
high in many neighborhoods, racial disparities abound, and the 
system is commonly viewed as opaque, ad-hoc, unfair, outdated, 
and ineffective.  
The ideas and practices associated with evidence-based 
criminal justice have likely advanced in no small part from a 
hope that data, science, and technology will bring improvements 
to a system in need of reform. However, enthusiasm for the po-
tential of new technologies may have led us to put the cart before 
the horse: widescale adoption of risk assessment before knowing 
anything about whether it will bring meaningful improvement. 
Risk assessment tools wear the clothes of an evidence-based 
practice—they are developed with the use of large data sets and 
sophistical techniques and endorsed by social scientists running 
policy simulations—but risk assessments should not be consid-
ered evidence-based until they have shown to be effective. 
This Article advocates a new direction in evidence-based 
criminal justice: one in which an iterative process of evaluation 
and adaptation is central. This involves a shift away from blindly 
adopting practices that bear the evidence-based moniker, and to-
ward integrating evaluation into the everyday operations of 
criminal justice. When a new technique is adopted, outcomes 
should be monitored to see if the desired effects were achieved. 
If they were not, adjustments can be made accordingly. In this 
paradigm, a method would be neither championed nor pilloried 
until its impacts in practice are clearly understood. This para-
digm is characterized by informed curiosity: a willingness to try 
new techniques, but also a willingness to learn and adjust if the 
new techniques did not work as hoped.  
In many ways, Kentucky Pretrial Services embodies that 
ideal. Over the years they have shown a continued willingness 
not only to try new methods, but also to evaluate how those 
 
 319. See, e.g., CREATIVE DISRUPTION: THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOL-
OGIES ON THE CREATIVE ECONOMY, WORLD ECON. FORUM (2018), http://www3 
.weforum.org/docs/39655_CREATIVE-DISRUPTION.pdf (discussing the im-
pact of emerging technologies on the creative economy).  
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methods have affected key outcomes, and change practices if 
need be. This capacity did not materialize out of thin air. For 
one, it requires a data infrastructure that took many years of 
hard work to develop and implement. Once developed, however, 
their data systems allowed them to monitor changes and trends 
in bail, release, and pretrial misconduct. For example, they have 
been aware that the release rate has been dropping precipi-
tously, particularly in urban areas. In cooperation with Ken-
tucky Pretrial Services, Kentucky’s highest court has recently 
declared a major revision in the way pretrial risk assessment is 
used in their state. As of 2017, all defendants who are rated low 
and moderate risk and who are charged with low level crimes 
(non-violent and non-sexual misdemeanors as well as certain 
Class D felonies) are granted immediate non-financial release.320 
No bail hearing is required, thus no judicial discretion is in-
volved in the decision. If the goal is to liberalize release for low 
level defendants, Kentucky’s new method of using risk assess-
ments may prove more effective than how they were used previ-
ously. Hopefully future studies will chart the impacts of this 
change and help advance our knowledge about the different 
ways risk assessments can be used in practice. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article began with a quote stating that we are beyond 
the point that risk assessment can be thought of as a trend, and 
into a “risk assessment era.”321 That one of the foremost exam-
ples of evidence-based criminal justice has advanced as far as it 
has with so little evidence on its impacts is a little unnerving. 
While evidence-based criminal justice is commonly cited as an 
ideal, we are still far from embodying it in practice.  
This Article evaluated the impacts of pretrial risk assess-
ment in a state that has been widely heralded as a leader in pre-
trial reform. It showed that pretrial risk assessment in Kentucky 
led to neither the dramatic efficiency gains predicted by risk as-
sessment’s champions, nor the increase in racial disparities pre-
dicted by its critics. While discussion and research about the ex-
pected outcomes of a change in policy will always be important, 
real world implementation can differ from what theory predicts 
in a number of ways. 
 
 320. Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail Admin-
istrative Release Program, No. 2016-10, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Administrative Re-
lease App. A (West through May 1, 2018). 
 321. Starr, supra note 6. 
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Empirical research evaluating risk assessment will expand, 
and we will learn more about the impacts of risk assessment in 
different contexts. Kentucky’s experience should temper expec-
tations but not eliminate hopes; risk assessment tools may prove 
to be a highly beneficial input to criminal justice, but under-
standing how and under what conditions is likely to take time 
and careful research.  
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APPENDIX  
Figure 14 confirms that the time trends shown in the main 
body of the text are not meaningfully influenced by changes in 
the type of defendants being arrested. The four graphs in Figure 
14 show, clockwise from top left, a variant of the time trend in 
non-financial release, release within three days, pretrial rear-
rest, and FTAs. Instead of showing the actual fraction of defend-
ants for whom each outcome was present, the figures show re-
siduals from a regression of the outcome on detailed variables 
describing the offense, basic demographics, and recent criminal 
history. These residuals are the difference between the actual 
outcome and the predicted outcome (where the predictions are 
based on the descriptors listed above). This process helps remove 
the effect of any change in defendants over time. For example, 
the fact that the release rate is declining over time might have 
been explained by a pattern in which the defendants arrested 
toward the end of the sample have committed more serious 
crimes than those who were arrested toward the beginning of the 
sample. If the charges that defendants are facing grow more se-
rious, it would not be surprising that the release rate fell.  
The trends shown in Figure 14 look quite similar to the time 
trends shown in Part II.D and Part II.E of this paper. The trends 
are centered at zero, since the vertical axis is measuring the dif-
ference between the predicted rates and the actual rates. How-
ever, the patterns are qualitatively quite similar, as are the mag-
nitudes of change. Thus, the evidence presented in Part II.D and 
II.E is likely explained by differences in pretrial practices as op-
posed to a change in the type of people who are arrested. 
Figure 15 also shows time trends in non-financial release, 
release within three days, FTA and pretrial rearrest. However, 
these trends are not built using linear smoothing like the figures 
in the main body of the text do. Figure 15 consists of scatter 
plots, where each dot represents the average outcome for all de-
fendants booked within a two-month span. As such, the figures 
are visually somewhat noisier. Nonetheless, the patterns remain 
the same: visually discernible increases in non-financial release, 
net release, FTA, and pretrial rearrest right after HB 463 is im-
plemented, and little discernible change around the adoption of 
the PSA. This eases concerns that any specific choices about the 
method of linear smoothing or the cuts in the time trend that 
were used in the graphs shown in the main body of the text cre-
ated misleading visual impressions. 
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Figure 16 shows time trends in the same four outcome 
measures that were shown in the previous figures, but the sam-
ple is limited to felony defendants who are not facing any drug 
charges. Since the other pretrial-related changes that were en-
acted as part of HB 463 are expected to mostly affect drug of-
fenders and misdemeanants, this specification helps ensure that 
the patterns we are seeing are truly a result of risk assessment. 
Once again, the results are qualitatively very similar: the same 
sharp changes are seen around the time of HB 463 and very little 
change around the adoption of the PSA. 
The top two graphs in Figure 17 provide alternative meth-
ods of evaluating time trends in FTAs and pretrial rearrest. The 
measures used in this figure were constructed from the data: a 
defendant was considered to have an FTA if the data shows that 
the same person was arrested for non-appearance after the orig-
inal booking date and before the original case was disposed. 
Likewise, for pretrial rearrest: a defendant is considered to have 
a pretrial rearrest if they are arrested on a new charge after the 
original booking date and before the original case was disposed. 
These measures are different from those used in the main body 
of the text. The pretrial misconduct measures used in Part III 
were inputted by pretrial services officers. Pretrial officers see 
all FTAs while the data shows only FTAs that resulted in an ar-
rest. These alternative measures provide a robustness check – a 
different method that shows similar results. Just like the figures 
shown in the main body of the text, Figure 17 shows an increase 
in FTAs and pretrial rearrest that occurs immediately after HB 
463, and no change after the adoption of the PSA.  
Finally, the bottom two graphs in Figure 17 show the frac-
tion of released defendants who had an FTA or pretrial rear-
rest.322 (Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the main text show the fraction 
of all defendants with an FTA or pretrial rearrest.) This allows 
us to evaluate the extent to which the increase in misconduct 
occurred solely because there were more people released. The 
bottom left graph in in Figure 17 shows that even looking solely 
at released defendants, the fraction with an FTA increases after 
HB 463. Thus, the changed conditions of release (non-financial 
release vs. release on low cash bond) or a change in the type of 
people who were released is likely responsible for the increase in 
FTAs once risk assessment became mandatory. However, the 
 
 322. The measures used here are the ones that were inputted by the pretrial 
officers, however the graphs look very similar to the ones constructed by the 
data. 
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bottom right graph in Figure 17 shows that the fraction of re-
leased defendants who have a pretrial rearrest, however, does 
not exhibit much of an increase after HB 463. Thus, the increase 
shown in Figure 8 is likely a result of an increase in the number 
of people released.  
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Note: Clockwise from top left, the figures show time trends in the 
fraction of defendants granted non-financial release, the fraction of 
defendants released within three days, the fraction who are arrested 
for a new offense during the pretrial period, and the fraction of de-
fendants who fail to appear to at least one court date. From left to 
right, the vertical lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was 
introduced as legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the 
date the PSA was adopted, and the date it was modified. The hori-
zontal axis is the booking date and the vertical axes are residuals 
from regressions where the predictor variables consist of the exact 
charge (for the 42 most common top charges), the total number of 
charges, whether the defendant had at least one class A, B, C or D 
felony, whether the defendant had at least one class A or B misde-
meanor, the age at arrest, gender, and whether the defendant had a 
prior arrest, a prior FTA, or a pending charge within the year before 
booking. The time trends begin in July of 2010 so that all defendants 
have at least one year of criminal history data. 
 
  














Note: Clockwise from top left, the figures show two month aver-
ages in the fraction of defendants granted non-financial release, 
the fraction of defendants released within three days, the fraction 
who are arrested for a new offense during the pretrial period, and 
the fraction of defendants who fail to appear to at least one court 
date. From left to right, the vertical lines in each chart indicate 
the date HB 463 was introduced as legislation, the date it was im-
plemented as law, the date the PSA was adopted, and the date it 
was modified.  
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Note: Clockwise from top left, the figures show time trends in the 
fraction of defendants charged with a non-drug-related felony who 
were granted non-financial release, released within three days, ar-
rested for a new offense during the pretrial period, and who failed 
to appear for at least one court date. From left to right, the vertical 
lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as 
legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA 
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Figure 17 - Alternative Specifications 
 
Top: Alternative measures of FTA and pretrial rearrest 
   
 
Bottom: FTA rate and pretrial rearrest rate defined as fraction of 
released defendants, not fraction of all defendants, with misconduct 
   
Note: The top left shows a time trend failures-to-appear and the 
top right shows a time trend in pretrial rearrest. While the FTA 
and pretrial rearrest measures used in the main body of the text 
were as reported by the pretrial officers, these measures were con-
structed from the data. A defendant was considered to have an 
FTA (pretrial rearrest) if the data shows that they were rearrested 
for an FTA between the time of the original arrest and the time of 
disposition. The bottom two figures show the same FTA and pre-
trial measure used in the main body of the text, but the time trend 
is the fraction of released defendants with one of these outcomes, 
not the fraction of all defendants. From left to right, the vertical 
lines in each chart indicate the date HB 463 was introduced as 
legislation, the date it was implemented as law, the date the PSA 
was adopted, and the date it was modified.  
 
